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China’s Financial System and the Law*
Franklin Allen† & Jun “QJ” Qian††
Law plays a different role in China’s financial system than in most
developed economies.  China’s financial system is dominated by a large
banking sector.  The role of the stock market in allocating resources in the
economy has been limited and ineffective.  The most successful part of the
financial system, in terms of supporting the growth of the overall economy,
is a shadow banking sector that consists of alternative financing channels,
governance mechanisms, and institutions.  These by and large do not rely
on the law but on other enforcement mechanisms.  The co-existence of this
sector with banks and markets can continue to support the growth of the
Hybrid Sector (non-state, non-listed firms).
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Introduction
In most financial systems, the law plays a crucial role. Finance is a
process by which lenders provide money to borrowers now in exchange for
payments in the future. The law usually provides a way of making such
promises credible.  Allen, Qian and Qian (AQQ) point out that China oper-
ates differently.1  During the last thirty-five years or so, China has been one
of the most successful economies in terms of growth.2  In 2014, the IMF
predicts that it will overtake the U.S. and become the largest economy in
the world in terms of Purchasing Power Parity.3  China has achieved this
despite formal financial institutions, poorly functioning markets, and an
ineffective legal system underpinning their operation.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive review of China’s financial
system and the legal system associated with it.4  Almost every functioning
financial system includes financial markets and intermediaries (e.g. a
banking sector), but how these two standard financial sectors contribute to
the entire financial system and economy differs significantly across differ-
ent countries.5  In this regard, we discuss what has worked and what has
not within the two sectors in China and consider the effects of further
development on the entire economy.  We also examine a shadow financial
sector, which operates outside the markets and banking sectors and con-
sists of alternative financing channels, governance mechanisms, and
institutions.
We draw three main conclusions about China’s financial system and
its future development.  First, China’s financial system has been dominated
by a large banking system. This is clear when China’s banking system and
financial markets is compared with those of both developed and emerging
countries.6  Even with the entrance and growth of many domestic and for-
1. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in
China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57, 59 (2005) [hereinafter AQQ, Law, Finance, and Economic
Growth].
2. See China Overview, THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.worldbank
.org/en/country/china/overview.
3. Ann Williams, Did China Just Overtake the US as World’s Largest Economy? Well,
Yes and No, THE STRAITS TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014, 3:18 PM), http://www.straitstimes.com/
news/business/economy/story/did-china-just-overtake-the-us-worlds-largest-economy-
well-yes-and-no-20.
4. This paper draws heavily on our previous work, including AQQ, Law, Finance,
and Economic Growth; Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, & Meijun Qian, China’s Financial Sys-
tem: Past, Present, and Future, in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 506 (Loren
Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008) [hereinafter AQQ, Past, Present, and Future];
Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Chenying Zhang & Mengxin Zhao, China’s Financial System:
Opportunities and Challenges, in CAPITALIZING CHINA 46 (Joseph P.H. Fan & Randall
Morck eds., 2013) [hereinafter AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges]. In particular, much
of the data and many of the arguments made are from the latter paper.
5. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, A Welfare Comparison of Intermediaries and
Financial Markets in Germany and the U.S., 39 EUR. ECON. R. 179, 180 (1995).
6. See AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4.
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eign banks and financial institutions in recent years, China’s banking sys-
tem is still mainly controlled by the four largest state-owned banks.7  All of
these “Big Four” banks have become publicly listed and traded companies
in recent years; the government is the largest shareholder and retains con-
trol of these institutions.8  This ownership structure has served these
banks well by avoiding the problems encountered by the major financial
institutions in developed countries that were at the center of the 2007-2009
global financial crisis.9  Continuous improvement of the banking system,
including further development of financial institutions outside the Big
Four banks and extension of more credit to productive firms and projects,
can help stabilize China’s financial system in the short run and can be
especially timely given the uncertainties in the Chinese and global
economies.10
Our second conclusion concerns China’s financial markets.  Two
domestic stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established in 1990.11  The scale
and importance of the stock exchanges are insignificant compared to the
banking sectors; the stock exchanges have not been effective in allocating
resources in the economy, because these stock exchanges remain specula-
tive and driven by insider trading.12  In recent years, the stock market has
witnessed significant development.13 As such, financial markets are likely
to play an increasingly significant role in the economy.14  We discuss sev-
eral issues and potential problems related to increasing the size and scope
and improving the efficiency of the stock and other financial markets.
Third, we find that the most successful part of the financial system, in
terms of supporting the economy’s overall growth, is neither the banking
sector nor the financial markets. Rather it is a sector of alternative financ-
ing channels, such as informal financial intermediaries; internal financing
and trade credits; and coalitions among firms, investors, and local govern-
7. See infra Table 4-B; AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 2.
8. Michael Wines, China Bank I.P.P. Raises $19 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/business/global/07ipo.html?_r=0.
9. See Tarhan Feyziog˘lu, Does Good Financial Performance Mean Good Financial
Intermediation in China? 4– 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 170, 2009),
available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09170.pdf.
10. See AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4, at 2.
11. SHELDON GAO, DOW JONES INDEXES, CHINA STOCK MARKET IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
1 (2002), available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jmei/b40/ChinaIndexCom.pdf.
12. Allen Berger et al., Bank Ownership and Efficiency in China: What Will Happen in
the World’s Largest Nation, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 113, 114 (2009) (“The banking industry
is larger than the stock markets in China, and as shown below, is very ineffi-
cient– particularly the Big Four banks.”); Michael Pettis, Why China’s Financial Markets
Are Inefficient, CHINA SPECTATOR (Nov. 28, 2013, 7:05 AM), http://www.businesss-
pectator.com.au/article/2013/11/28/china/why-chinas-financial-markets-are-
inefficient.
13. Jennifer N. Carpenter et al., The Real Value of China’s Stock Market 1 (2014),
available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jcarpen0/pdfs/Carpenter%20Lu%20Whitelaw
%202014%20-%20The%20Real%20Value%20of%20China’s%20Stock%20Market.pdf.
14. Id. at 21.
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ments.15  This alternative system is often referred to as the shadow banking
system.16  Many of these financing channels do not rely on the law for
enforcement but depend on other enforcement mechanisms, such as com-
petition in product and input markets, as well as trust, reputation, and
relationships.17  This alternative financial sector, together with the banking
system and the financial markets, has supported the growth of a “Hybrid
Sector” with various types of ownership structures.18  Our definition of the
Hybrid Sector includes all non-state, non-listed firms, including privately
or individually owned firms, and firms that are partially owned by local
governments (e.g. Township Village Enterprises or TVEs).19  The growth of
the Hybrid Sector has been much higher than that of the State Sector (state-
owned enterprises or SOEs, and all firms where the central government has
ultimate control) and the Listed Sector (publicly listed and traded firms,
with most of them having been converted from the State Sector).20 The
Hybrid Sector contributes to most of China’s economic growth, and it
employs the majority of the labor force.21  The co-existence of the alterna-
tive financial sector with banks and markets can continue to fuel the
growth of the Hybrid Sector.22
This paper draws heavily on our previous work including “Law,
Finance, and Economic Growth in China” by Franklin Allen, Jun Qian &
Meijun Qian (AQQ (2005)), “China’s Financial System: Past, Present, and
Future,” a chapter in China’s Great Economic Transformation, also by
Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian (AQQ (2008)); and “China’s
Financial System: Opportunities and Challenges,” a chapter in Capitalizing
China by Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Chenying Zhang & Mengxin Zhao
(AQZZ (2013)).  The remaining sections are organized as follows.  In Sec-
tion I, we briefly review the history of China’s financial system, present
aggregate evidence on China’s financial system, and compare China’s
financial system to those of developed and other developing countries.  In
Section II, we examine China’s banking system and how it has changed
over time.  In Section III, we briefly examine the growth and irregularities
of financial markets, including the stock market, and listed firms.  We also
consider the effects of several initiatives to develop new markets and fur-
ther develop existing markets, as well as changes in corporate governance
15. AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 96.
16. Jing Jiang, Shadow Banking in China: Battling the Darkness, THE ECONOMIST (May
10, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21601872-every-
time-regulators-curb-one-form-non-bank-lending-another-begins.
17. AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 96.
18. AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4, at 506.
19. Id. at 507.  We include firms partially owned by local governments in the
Hybrid Sector for two reasons. First, despite the ownership stake of local governments
and the sometimes ambiguous ownership structure and property rights, the operation of
these firms resembles more closely that of a for-profit, privately-owned firm than that of
a state-owned firm. Second, the ownership stake of local governments in many of these
firms has been privatized.
20. Id. at 507– 08.
21. Id. at 508.
22. Id.
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among listed firms.  In Section IV, we examine the shadow financial sector,
including alternative financial channels and governance mechanisms.
Motivated by the success of this financial sector and firms in the Hybrid
Sector, we also compare the advantages and disadvantages of using the law
as the basis of finance and commerce.  When converting RMB into US dol-
lar, we use the exchange rate of US$1 = RMB 8.28 (yuan) for transactions
and events occurring before 2005, and we use the spot rate at the end of
each year for activities that occur during and after 2005.
I. Overview of China’s Financial System
A. A Brief Review of the History of China’s Financial System
China’s financial system was well developed before 1949.23  One key
finding in reviewing the history of this period, including the rise of Shang-
hai as one of the financial centers of Asia during the first half of the 20th
Century, is that the development of China’s commerce and financial sys-
tem as a whole was largely outside of the formal legal system.24  For exam-
ple, despite the introduction of Western-style courts in Shanghai and other
major coastal cities in the early 1900s, most business-related disputes were
resolved through mechanisms outside of the courts, including guilds
(merchant coalitions), families and local notables.25  In Section IV.C
below, we argue that modern equivalents of these non-legal dispute-resolu-
tion and corporate governance mechanisms are behind the success of
Hybrid Sector firms in the same areas in the 1980s and 1990s.  These alter-
native mechanisms may be more responsive in adapting to changes in a
fast-growing economy like China than the law and legal institutions.
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, all of the
pre-1949 capitalist companies and institutions were nationalized by
1950.26  Between 1950 and 1978, China’s financial system consisted of a
single bank - the People’s Bank of China (PBOC).  This bank was owned
and controlled by the central government under the Ministry of Finance. It
served as both the central bank and a commercial bank, controlling about
23. For more descriptions of the pre-1949 history of China’s financial system, see
AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4. For more anecdotal evidence on China’s
financial system in the same period, see, e.g., William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated:
Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43
(1995).
24. See AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4, at 509.
25. See Kirby, supra note 23, at 45.  For descriptions of family- and community-
based mechanisms for contract enforcement, see, e.g., Stephanie P. Chung, Changes and
Continuities: Evolution of a Chinese Family Business (1876– 2004), 3 ASIA EUR. J. 259, 260
(2005).  When examining how disputes were resolved both in and outside of court,
Goetzmann and Ko¨ll concluded that the passing of China’s first Company law in 1904,
which was intended to provide a better legal environment for business and commerce,
did not lead to actual changes in corporate governance or the better protection of minor-
ity shareholder rights. See William Goetzman & Elisabeth Ko¨ll, The History of Corporate
Ownership in China: State Patronage, Company Legislation, and the Issue of Control, in A
HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO
PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 150– 51 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 2005).
26. See Kirby, supra note 23, at 56.
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93% of the total financial assets of the country and handling almost all
financial transactions.27  Functioning primarily to finance the physical
production plans, the PBOC used both a “cash-plan” and a “credit-plan” to
control the cash flows in consumer markets and transfer flows between
branches.28
The first main structural change began in 1978 and ended in 1984.29
By the end of 1979, the PBOC dissociated itself from the Ministry and
became a separate entity, while three state-owned banks took over some of
its commercial banking businesses. The Bank of China30 (BOC) was given
the mandate to specialize in transactions related to foreign trade and invest-
ment; the People’s Construction Bank of China (PCBC), created in 1954,
was set up to handle transactions related to fixed investment, especially in
manufacturing; and the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) was created in
1979 to manage all banking business in rural areas. The PBOC itself was
formally established as China’s central bank.31  Finally, the fourth state-
owned commercial bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
(ICBC) was formed in 1984, and took over the rest of the commercial trans-
actions of the PBOC.32
For most of the 1980s, the development of China’s financial system
can be characterized by the fast growth of financial intermediaries outside
of the “Big Four” banks.33  Regional banks (partially owned by local gov-
ernments) were formed in the Special Economic Zones in the coastal areas;
in rural areas, a network of Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), which are
similar to credit unions in the United States, was set up under the supervi-
sion of the ABC; and Urban Credit Cooperatives (UCCs), counterparts of
the RCCs in the urban areas, were also founded.34  Non-bank financial
intermediaries, such as the Trust and Investment Corporations (TICs),
which operated in selected banking and non-banking services with restric-
tions on both deposits and loans, emerged and proliferated in this
period.35
The most significant event for China’s financial system in the 1990s
was the inception and growth of China’s stock market.36  Two domestic
stock exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) were established in 1990 and grew
quickly, with respect to the total market capitalization and trading volume,
during most of the 1990s and in recent years.37  The real estate market
paralleled the stock market, growing from nonexistent in the early 1990s to
27. See AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4, at 509.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. BOC, which is among the oldest banks currently in operation, was originally
established in 1912 as a private bank and specialized in foreign currency related trans-
actions. Id.
31. Id. at 509– 10.
32. Id. at 510.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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being a significant market in recent years.  Both the stock and real estate
markets have experienced major corrections during the past decade, and
are characterized by high volatilities and speculative short-term behaviors
by many investors.38
These patterns are due, in part, to the fact that the development of a
supportive legal framework and institutions has been lagging behind that
of the markets.39  For example, China’s first bankruptcy law governing
SOEs was passed in 1986 on a trial basis, but the formal Company Law did
not become effective until the end of 1999.40  This version of the Company
Law governs all corporations with limited liability, publicly listed and
traded companies, and branches or divisions of foreign companies, as well
as the organization structure, securities issuance and trading, accounting,
bankruptcy, and mergers and acquisitions of those companies.41 China
enacted a new bankruptcy law in August 27, 2006 that became effective
June 1, 2007.42  We provide a brief analysis of the status and problems of
the stock market and real estate market in Section V below.
Following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, financial sector reform
focused on state-owned banks, especially the problem of NPLs.43  We will
further discuss this issue in Section II.  China’s entry into the WTO in
December 2001 marked the beginning of a new era, as we continue to
observe increasing competition from foreign financial institutions and
more frequent and larger-scale capital flows.44
A developed financial system is characterized by, among other factors,
the substantial role played by institutional investors.45  In China, institu-
tional investors began to emerge in the late 1990s: the first closed-ended
fund, from which investors cannot withdraw capital after initial invest-
ment, was set up in 1997, and the first open-ended fund, from which inves-
tors can freely withdraw capital (subject to share redemption restrictions),
was established in 2001.46  By November 2013, there were 89 fund compa-
nies.47  The total net assets value (NAV) increased from RMB 11 billion (or
US $1.3 billion) in 1998 to RMB 2.58 trillion or $322 billion in May 2008,
38. See Daniel Chow, China’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis: Implications for
U.S.-China Economic Relations, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 47, 65 (2011); Jing Leng, The Inter-
action Between Domestic and Overseas Capital Markets and Corporate Governance of Chi-
nese Listed Companies, 7 STUD. INT’L FIN. ECON. & TECH L. 273, 284 (2005).
39. See AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4, at 510.
40. See id.
41. See id.  For more details on this law and its scope, see CHINA SEC. REGULATORY
COMM’N (CSRC), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en (last visited June 6, 2014).
42. See AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4, at 510.
43. See id. The China Banking Regulation Committee (CBRC) was also established
to oversee the banking industry.
44. See id.
45. See AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4, at 511.
46. See id.
47. List of Fund Management Companies (November 2013), CHINA SEC. REGULATORY
COMM’N, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/participants/FundsRelatedList/Fund
ManagementCompanies/201401/t20140110_242346.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
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which was still small compared to the assets within the banking sector.48
In 2003, a few Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) entered
China’s asset management industry, where they have been operating
through forming joint ventures with Chinese companies.49  In 2011, China
approved the RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII), which
allows QFII to invest in Chinese stock and bond markets within a predeter-
mined limit.50  On the other hand, China allowed Qualified Domestic Insti-
tutional Investors (QDII) to invest in overseas markets beginning in July
2006.51
At the national level, the China Investment Corporation (CIC) was
established in September 2007 with the intent of utilizing the accumulated
foreign reserves for the benefit of the state, and part of the foreign reserves
were placed under management at the establishment.52  CIC makes occa-
sional announcements about its investments, but the overall transparency
of its investment strategy is low.53  Since inception, CIC has made some
aggressive investment decisions, including the well-publicized $3 billion
(pre-IPO) investment in private equity group Blackstone, and the $5 billion
investment in Morgan Stanley (this took the form of mandatory convertible
bonds that can be converted into almost 10% of the firm’s equity).54
Endowed with limited capital and given the problems with the admin-
istration of the pension system, pension funds have not played a significant
role in the stock or bond markets.55 With a fast aging population and the
growth of household disposable incomes, further development of a multi-
pillar pension system that includes individual accounts with employees’
self-contributed and tax-exempt funds that can be directly invested in the
financial markets can lead to the development of both the financial system
and the fiscal system, as well as the development of social stability.56
48. Franklin Allen et al., A Review of China’s Financial System and Initiatives for the
Future, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 8
(James R. Barth, John A. Tatom & Glenn Yago eds., 2009) [hereinafter, Allen et al., A
Review of China’s Financial System].
49. AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4, at 511.
50. YONG ZHEN, CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS 250 (2013).
51. Allen et al., A Review of China’s Financial System, supra note 48, at 49.
52. Fund Profile: China Investment Corporation (CIC), THE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND
INITIATIVE (Feb. 2012), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/SWFI-OLD/~/media/Fletcher/Micro
sites/swfi/pdfs/2012/profiles/CIC%20Fund%20Profile_Final.pdf (last visited Oct. 7,
2014).
53. Michael H. Cognato, China Investment Corporation: Threat or Opportunity?, in 19
NBR ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S NEW SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 21 (July 2008).
54. Id. at 21– 22.
55. AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4, at 511.
56. Id.
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Figure 1:  Overview of China’s Financial System
China’s Financial
System
Banking and Intermediation
Sector
Policy Banks
Commercial banks
State Owned 
Partially state
owned
Private owned
and Foreign
Non-bank Financial
Institutions
RCC, UCC, Postal
Savings
TIC, Mutual Funds,
Finance Companies
Financial Markets
Stock market
(SHSE, SZSE,
HKSE)
Bond market
Government bond
Corporate bond
Venture Capital/PE
Real Estate
Non-standard
Financial Sector
Informal Financial
Institutions
Coalitions/ institutions among
Hybrid Sector firms and
their investors
Foreign sectors
(FDI, Capital
Flows)
Figure 1 depicts the current structure of the entire financial system.  In
what follows, we will describe and examine each of the major sectors of the
financial system.  In addition to the standard sectors of banking and inter-
mediation, and financial markets, we will document the importance of the
shadow financial sector.57
57. Due to space limitations, we do not cover China’s “foreign sectors” in this paper.
For discussions on the history and the role of these sectors in supporting the growth of
the economy, see, e.g., Eswar Prasad & Shang-Jin Wei, The Chinese Approach to Capital
Inflows: Patterns and Possible Explanations, in CAPITAL CONTROLS AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN
EMERGING ECONOMIES: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND CONSEQUENCES (Sebastian Edwards, ed.,
2007) for a review.
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B. Size and Efficiency of the Financial System: Banks, Markets, and
Alternative Finance
In Table 1, we compare China’s financial system to those of other
major emerging economies, with measures for the size and efficiency of
banks and markets taken from Levine (2002), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine
(2001), and data from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development
Database (GFDD).  We present average figures from 2001-2011 for each
country as well as the average of all the other emerging economies (exclud-
ing China).  We first compare the size of a country’s banks and equity mar-
kets relative to that country’s gross domestic product (GDP).  In terms of
total market capitalization, China’s stock market, at 63% of its GDP over
the period 2001-2011, is slightly larger than the 57% of GDP average of the
other major emerging economies.58  “Value traded” is perhaps a better mea-
sure of the actual size of the market than “market capitalization,” because
the latter includes non-tradable shares or tradable shares that are rarely
traded.59  However, the majority of the bank credit goes to state-owned
firms in China and only a small fraction goes to firms in the Hybrid Sector
(more evidence of this is given below).60  In addition, NPLs account for a
larger percentage of all the loans in China at 11% than the average percent-
age in other emerging economies at 8%, indicating that China’s banking
sector still has room to improve its efficiency.61
58. See infra Table 1.
59. Allen et al., A Review of China’s Financial System, supra note 48, at 11.
60. AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 77.
61. See supra Table 1; see also id. at 72.  Levine (2002) uses bank overhead cost/total
assets to measure banking sector efficiency, and used this measure to construct the
“Structure Efficiency” and “Finance Efficiency” measures. However, the World Bank
Financial Database no longer reports the overhead cost/assets ratio. We replace the over-
head costs/assets ratio with the NPLs/loans ratio as an alternative measure of efficiency
and use this variable to define other efficiency measures in Table 1.
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The next two columns of Table 1 (Structure Indices) compare the rela-
tive importance of financial markets versus banks, with a lower score indi-
cating that banks are more important relative to markets.  China’s score for
“Structure Size” (log of the ratio of Market Capitalization/Total Bank
Credit) is negative, suggesting that the size of total market capitalization is
actually smaller than that of bank credit, and the score is lower than the
average of other emerging economies. Its score for “Structure Activity” (log
of the ratio of Total Value Traded/Total Bank Credit) is negative, indicating
that the trading volume of markets is still smaller than bank credit, and its
Structure Activity is slightly larger than the average of other emerging econ-
omies.  Taken together, these numbers suggest that the financial systems of
most emerging economies, including that of China, remain bank-domi-
nated.62  In terms of “Structure Efficiency” (log of product (market capitali-
zation/GDP) × (bank NPLs/bank total loans)), which denotes the relative
efficiency of markets versus banks, China has a higher score than most
other developing countries, suggesting that its banks are relatively less effi-
cient than markets when compared to the efficiency of other countries.63
“Structure Regulatory” is based on 2005 data and measures the extent to
which commercial banks are restricted in participating in activities outside
commercial lending. China’s score of 16 is higher than most other coun-
tries, suggesting that by law commercial banks in China face tight restric-
tions in operating in other areas.64
We also compare the development of the financial system (Financial
Development), including both banks and markets (the last three columns
of Table 1).  China’s overall financial market size, in terms of both “Finance
Activity” (Log of product of (Total Value Traded/GDP) × (Bank credit/
GDP)) and “Finance Size” (Log of product of (Market capitalization/GDP)
× (Bank credit/GDP)), is larger than the average market size of other emerg-
ing countries.65  For “Finance Efficiency” (Log of (Total Value Traded/
GDP)/Bank NPLs Ratio), China’s measure is also higher than the average
measure of other emerging countries.66  Based on the evidence from the
past decade, we can conclude that China’s banks and markets, or at least
the formal sectors of the financial system, are, relative to the size of China’s
economy, as large as or larger than that of other major emerging econo-
mies.67  However, the banking sector does not lend much to the Hybrid
Sector, which, as we will see in Section IV, is the dynamic part of the
economy.
Related to the size of banks and markets is the question: where do
most firms get their capital and funds?  As shown in AQQ (2005) and
AQQ (2008), the four most important financing sources for all firms in
China, in terms of firms’ fixed asset investments, are domestic bank loans,
62. AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 72.
63. AQQ, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 4, at 514.
64. Allen et al., A Review of China’s Financial System, supra note 48, at 11.
65. Id. at 14.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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firms’ self-fundraising, the state budget, and FDI, with self-fundraising and
bank loans carrying most of the weight.  Self-fundraising, falling into the
category of alternative finance (non-bank, non-market finance), includes
proceeds from capital raised from local governments (beyond the state
budget), communities, and other investors; internal financing channels
such as retained earnings; and all other funds raised domestically by the
firms.  It is important to point out that equity and bond issuance, which
are included in self-fundraising (but fall into the category of formal exter-
nal finance), apply only to the Listed Sector, and account for a small frac-
tion of this category.68
While the Listed Sector has been growing rapidly, SOEs are on a
downward trend, as privatization of these firms is still in progress.69
Around 30% of the funding for publicly traded companies comes from
bank loans, and this ratio has been very stable.70  Around 45% of the
Listed Sector’s total funding comes from self-fundraising, including inter-
nal financing and proceeds from equity and bond issuance.71  Moreover,
equity and bond sales, which rely on the use of external markets, only
constitute a small fraction of total funds raised in comparison to internal
financing and other forms of fundraising.72  Combined with the fact that
self-fundraising is also the most important source of financing for the State
Sector— around 45% to 65% of total funding— we can conclude that alter-
native channels of financing are important even for the State and Listed
Sectors.73
Not surprisingly, self-fundraising plays an even more important role
for firms in the Hybrid Sector, accounting for close to 60% of total funds
raised, while individually owned companies— a subset of the Hybrid Sec-
tor— rely on self-fundraising for 90% of total financing.74  Self-fundraising
includes all forms of internal finance, capital raised from family and
friends of the founders and managers, and funds raised in the form of
private equity and loans.75  Since firms in this sector operate in an environ-
ment with legal and financial mechanisms and regulations that are likely
poorer than those available for firms in the State and Listed Sectors, financ-
ing sources here may work differently from how they work in the State and
Listed Sectors, and may also work differently from self-fundraising con-
ducted in developed countries.76
68. AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 73.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 73– 74.
74. Id. at 74.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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II. The Banking and Intermediation Sector
In this section, we examine the status of China’s banking and interme-
diation sector.  After reviewing aggregate evidence on bank deposits and
loans, we review evidence on the growth of non-state banks and financial
intermediaries.
A. Aggregate Evidence on Bank Deposits and Loans
As in other Asian countries, China’s household savings rates have
been high throughout the reform era.77  Given the growth of the economy,
the sharp increase in personal income, and limited investment opportuni-
ties, it is not surprising that total bank deposits from individuals have been
growing quickly since the mid-1980s.78  From Figure 2-A, residents in met-
ropolitan areas contribute the most to total deposits beginning in the late
1980s, while deposits from enterprises (including firms from all three sec-
tors) provide the second largest source.  The role of deposits from govern-
ment agencies and organizations (including non-profit and for-profit
organizations, not shown in the figure) has steadily decreased over time.79
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Figure 2-A:  Sources for Bank Deposits in China
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Table 2-A compares total savings and bank deposits in China, Japan,
South Korea, and India, during the period of 1997-2012.  In terms of the
ratio of Time and Savings Deposits/GDP, China maintains the highest or
second highest level (an average of over 90% in recent years), while Japan
leads the group in terms of total amount.  Looking at the breakdown of
bank deposits, interest-bearing “savings deposits” are by far the most
important form of deposits in China, providing a good source for bank
loans and other forms of investment.  Figure 2-B compares total (non-state)
bank credit (over GDP) extended to Hybrid Sector firms in China and pri-
vately owned firms (including those publicly listed and traded) in Taiwan
and South Korea.  For South Korea, we also plot the bank credit ratios dur-
ing its high economic growth period of the 1970s and 1980s (each year
appearing on the horizontal axis indicates the time period for China, while
a particular year minus 20 indicates the time period for South Korea).  We
can see that the scale and growth of China’s ‘hybrid’ bank credit during
1991-2009 are far below that of the private bank credit of Taiwan and
South Korea in the same period, but are similar to those of South Korea
twenty years ago.
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Figure 2-B:  Comparing Total Bank Credit extended to private/hybrid
sectors
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Table 2-B breaks down China’s bank loans by maturities, loan pur-
poses, and borrower types during the period of 1994– 2012.80  While there
has been a shift from short-term to long-term loans (first two columns), the
majority of loans goes to SOEs in manufacturing industries (Industrial
Loans and Commercial Loans).81  Most of the “Infrastructure/Construc-
tion Loans” (a small component of total loans) fund government sponsored
projects, while the size of “Agricultural Loans” is much smaller.82  More
importantly, the size of loans made to TVEs, privately- and collectively-
owned firms, and joint ventures (last three columns), all of which belong to
the Hybrid Sector, is also much smaller.83
B. Growth of Non-state Financial Intermediaries
The development of both non-state banks and other (state and non-
state) financial institutions will allow China to have a stable and function-
ing banking system in the future.84  In addition to boosting the overall effi-
ciency of the banking system, these financial institutions provide funding
80. We have not been able to obtain the continuous data under the old classification
since 2010 because the PBOC changed the breakdown method of bank loans in terms of
loan purposes and borrower types at that time.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 76– 77.
84. See generally International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, China:
Financial Sector Assessment, WORLD BANK 6 (2011).
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to support the growth of the Hybrid Sector.85
Recent Development of Shadow Banking
Due to the strong demand of capital by the real economy, shadow
banking— which includes trust loans, entrusted loans, loans by small-scale
lending companies, corporate bonds, and informal finances, etc.— has been
growing rapidly since 2009.86 We will leave the development of corporate
bonds for Part IV and informal financing for Part V. In this part we will
elaborate on trends of trust loans, entrusted loans and loans by small-scale
lending companies. The growth of banks’ wealth management products
also reflects the development of the shadow banking system.87 However,
here we do not include wealth management products into shadow banking
as this would involve double counting.
Due to the limited loan quota of the banking system and the strong
demand of capital by the real economy, financing through shadow banking
has been growing rapidly since 2009.88 First, we examine the entrusted
loans, trust loans and corporate bonds, all of which are included in the
total social financing. The term Total Social Financing (TSF), first intro-
duced by the governor of the PBOC, Xiaolian Hu, in her speech on Decem-
ber 24, 2010, is a liquidity measure which covers loans in local currency,
loans in foreign currency, entrusted loans, trusted loans, bank acceptance
bills, net corporate bond financing, and non-financial enterprise equity
financing.89 The PBOC elaborated on the statistics’ details and the mean-
ings of this term in China’s Monetary Policy Report Quarter Four of 2010 in
January 2011,90 and it started to publish monthly data for this indicator.
Since then, this indicator has been seen as one of the most important mon-
etary indicators in China, because traditional monetary indicators such as
M2 fail to take all of the social financing sources into account.91 Table 3-A
describes the breakdown of China’s total social financing from 2002 to
85. See Allen et al., supra note 4, at 3– 4.
86. See Kate Mackenzie, Deflating Shadow Credit in China, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/02/27/1397152/deflating-shadow-credit-in-china.
87. Id.
88. Jamil Anderlini, Into The Shadows: Risky Business, Global Threat, FIN. TIMES (June
15, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/a123375a-d774-11e3-a47c-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz3Ffw4w9Vp.
89. See COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/235: PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND 42 (2014).
90. The term Total Social Financing (TSF), is defined by the PBOC as the total funds
that the real economy obtained from the financial system over a certain period of time.
It measures money offered by domestic suppliers, including financial institutions, Chi-
nese households and non-financial entities. Thus, it offers a view of both borrowers and
lenders. It also excludes proceeds from government bonds, which are used for govern-
ment spending and deficit coverage, as well as all foreign-related items, such as foreign
direct investment (FDI) and overseas debt. See Bob Davis, Slower China Credit Is a Risk
to Growth, WALL St. J. (June 9, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424
127887324299104578534340906234614.
91. See generally Zhou Xiaochuan et al., THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA ANNUAL REPORT
2010 (2011), available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/image_public/UserFiles/english/up
load/File/Annual%20Report%202010.pdf.
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2012. During that period, trust loans, entrusted loans, and net corporate
bond financing ranked in the top three sources for social financing in
terms of average annual growth, with the rate of 58.0%, 53.7%, and 51.0%,
respectively.92 The average annual growth rate of total social financing
from 2002 to 2012 is 22.9%, much higher than the growth rate of M2
(18.3%) and that of the outstanding bank loans (17.0%) within the same
period, indicating that the other sources of financing have been growing
dramatically in the recent years.93  By 2012, loans in both local and foreign
currency accounted for 57.9% of total social financing.94  Entrusted loans,
trust loans, and net corporate bond financing accounted for only 8.1%,
8.1% and 14.3%, respectively, but are on an upward trend.95  Besides these
three sources, loans by small-scale companies also have been growing rap-
idly since 2010.96  By September 2013, the amount of outstanding loans
by small-scale lending companies was RMB 753.5 billion.97 The total num-
ber of small-scale lending companies grew from about 2,500 in December
2010 to 7,398 in September 2013.98
The high growth of credit through shadow banking is driven by the
following factors. First, the bank loan quota is still restricted by the regula-
tory requirements.99  Thus, the funding demand is much higher than the
supply of bank loans.100  In this situation, shadow banking has been grow-
ing rapidly to meet the demand of funds by the real economy.101  Second,
due to the restrictions on real estate loans, the funding demand in real
estate and for local government financing platforms cannot be satisfied.102
In this case, those real estate enterprises can only get funds through trust
loans or other sources.103 Third, the growth rate of bank deposits was
92. See MONETARY POLICY ANALYSIS GROUP OF THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, CHINA
MONETARY POLICY REPORT, QUARTER FOUR, 2012, THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA 5– 6
(2013), available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/image_public/UserFiles/english/upload/
File/%E8%B4%A7%E5%B8%81%E6%94%BF%E7%AD%96%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8
A(1).pdf.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 5– 7.
97. Due to the fast growth of small-scale lending companies, the PBOC started to
release the quarterly report on small-scale lending companies since the fourth quarter of
2010. See generally MICRO CREDIT COMPANY STATISTICS BY PROVINCES (MUNICIPALITIES)
(2013), THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/
english/955/2013/20131030084112766413637/20131030084112766413637.html
[hereinafter MICRO CREDIT COMPANY STATISTICS].
98. See China Microfinance, Micro-Credit Companies, MICRO FINANCE CHINA, available
at http://www.microfinancechina.org/micro-credit-companies.html; MICRO CREDIT COM-
PANY STATISTICS, supra note 97.
99. See generally Margaret K. Lewis, Criminal Law Pays: Penal Law’s Contribution to
China’s Economic Development, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 371, 423– 24 (2014).
100. See id.
101. See Jiang, supra note 16.
102. See generally CHINESE SHADOW BANKING: UNDERSTANDING KRIS AND RISK SCENA-
RIOS, THOMSON REUTERS ACCELUS, available at http://accelus.thomsonreuters.com/white
paper/chinese-shadow-banking-understanding-kris-and-risk-scenarios.
103. See id.
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Figure 2-C:  Recent Growth of Banks’ Wealth Management Products
(2009– 2013)
Fund Balance of Banks’ Wealth Management Product
Banks’ Wealth Management Product Weighted Average Rate of Return
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much lower than that of bank loans for a long period starting from 1979,
except the years of 1984 to 1986, 1988, and 1997.104  Since 2009, the
opposite situation has started to take place.105 This is partly due to the
restricted deposit interest rate and the relatively higher required return of
financial assets by Chinese households, and also partly due to the drop of
trade surplus and capital inflows after 2009.106 In order to meet the
requirement of the ratio of loan to deposit (LTD) set by the CBRC, banks
have to raise funds by issuing wealth management products.107
104. See generally AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 63– 138.
105. See generally Allen et al., The IPO of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and
the ‘Chinese Model’ ‘of Privatizing Large Financial Institutions, EUR. J. FIN. (2012).
106. See id. at 93.
107. See generally The People’s Bank of China Annual Report 2012, THE PEOPLE’S BANK
OF CHINA (2013), available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/4133/2013/
20130829090453489508948/20130829090453489508948.html.
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Table 3-B:  State-owned and Private Banks in China (RMB billion)
Total Total Outstanding NPL rate
Types of Banks Assets Deposits Loans Profit1 (%)
2012
Big Five Banks 60,040.0 — — 754.6 1.0
Other Commercial Banks 35,874.0 — — — —
1) Joint Equity 23,527.0 — — 136.8 0.7
2) City Commercial Banks 12,347.0 — — 252.6 0.8
Foreign Banks 2380.4 1307.2 — 16.34 0.5
Urban Credit Cooperatives — 3.3(-Sep.) — — —
Rural Credit Cooperatives 7,953.5 5,974.0 — 65.4 —
2011
Big Five Banks 53,634.0 — — 664.7 1.1
Other Commercial Banks 28,363.5 — — — —
1) Joint Equity 18,379.0 — — 200.5 0.6
2) City Commercial Banks 9,984.5 — — 108.1 0.8
Foreign Banks 2153.5 1220.2 934.63 16.7 0.4
Urban Credit Cooperatives 3.0 5.5 3.46 0.02 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives 7,204.7 5,570.3 3955.12 53.1 —
2010
Big Five Banks 46,894.0 — — 515.1 1.3
Other Commercial Banks 22,756.6 — — — —
1) Joint Equity 14,904.0 — — 135.8 0.7
2) City Commercial Banks 7,852.6 — — 77.0 0.9
Foreign Banks 1742.3 967.7 818.54 11.9 0.5
Urban Credit Cooperatives 2.2 9.7 6.78 0.01 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives 6,391.1 5,050.0 3601.63 23.3 —
2009
Big Five Banks 40,089.0 29,506.5 20,151.7 400.1 1.8
Other Commercial Banks 17,465.0 15,041.5 9,606.6 — —
1) Joint Equity 11,785.0 10,548.7 6,707.4 92.5 1.0
2) City Commercial Banks 5,680.0 4,492.8 2,899.2 49.7 1.3
Foreign Banks 1,349.2 668.8 727.1 6.5 0.9
Urban Credit Cooperatives 27.2 39.5 — 0.2 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives 5,492.5 4,742.1 5,421.3 22.8 —
2008
Big Five Banks 31,836.0 23,696.1 15,029.3 354.2 2.8
Other Commercial Banks 12,941.2 11,072.2 7,162.4 — —
1) Joint Equity 8,809.2 7,801.8 5,054.5 84.1 1.3
2) City Commercial Banks 4,132.0 3,270.4 2,107.9 40.8 2.3
Foreign Banks 1,344.8 533.5 762.1 11.9 0.8
Urban Credit Cooperatives 80.4 76.2 — 0.62 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives 5,211.3 4,173.6 3,753.2 21.9 —
2007
Big Five Banks 28,007.0 20,067.7 13,850.9 246.6 8.05
Other Commercial Banks 10,589.9 9,023.3 5,684.4 — —
1) Joint Equity 7,249.4 6,432.0 4,001.9 56.4 2.15
2) City Commercial Banks 3,340.5 2,591.4 1,682.6 24.8 3.04
Foreign Banks 1,252.5 390.0 700.0 6.1 0.46
Urban Credit Cooperatives 131.2 134.1 84.7 0.77 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives 4,343.4 3,534.9 3,256.1 19.3 —
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2006
Big Five Banks 24,236 18,285.1 11,426.2 197.5 9.22
Other Commercial Banks 8,038.4 7512.8 5526.6 — —
1) Joint Equity 5,444.6 5,396.5 4,156.9 43.4 2.81
2) City Commercial Banks 2,593.8 2,116.2 1,369.7 18.1 4.78
Foreign Banks 927.9 244.0 485.9 5.8 0.78
Urban Credit Cooperatives 183.1 157.9 100.7 1.0 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives 3,450.3 3,040.2 2,747.6 18.6 —
2005
Big Five Banks2 21,005.0 16,283.8 10,224.0 156.1 10.49
Other Commercial Banks 6,502.2 6,261.1 4,576.6 — —
1) Joint Equity 4,465.5 4,570.0 3,487.7 28.9 4.22
2) City Commercial Banks 2,036.7 16,91.2 1,088.9 12.1 7.73
Foreign Banks 715.5 179.3 363.8 3.7 1.05
Urban Credit Cooperatives 203.3 181.3 113.1 0.9 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives 3,142.7 2,767.4 2,319.9 12.0 —
2004
Big Four Banks 16,932.1 14,412.3 10,086.1 45.9 15.57
Other Commercial Banks 4,697.2 4,059.9 2,885.9 50.7 4.93
1) Joint Equity — — — 17.6 5.01
2) City Commercial Banks 1,693.8 1,434.1 904.5 8.5 11.73
Foreign Banks 515.9 126.4 255.8 18.8 1.34
Urban Credit Cooperatives 171.5 154.9 97.9 0.4 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives 3,101.3 2,734.8 1,974.8 9.65 —
2003
Big Four Banks 16,275.1 13,071.9 9,950.1 196.5 19.74
Other Commercial Banks 3,816.8 3,286.5 2,368.2 — 7.92
1) Joint Equity 14.6 6.5
2) City Commercial Banks 1,465.4 1,174.7 774.4 5.4 14.94
Foreign Banks 333.1 90.7 147.6 18.1 2.87
Urban Credit Cooperatives 148.7 127.1 85.6 0.01 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives 2,674.6 2,376.5 1,775.9 4.4 —
2002
Big Four Banks 14,450.0 11,840.0 8,460.0 71.0 26.1
Other Commercial Banks 4,160.0 3,390.0 2,290.0 — —
1) Joint Equity 2,990.0 — — — 9.5
2) City Commercial Banks 1,170.0 — — — 17.7
Foreign Banks 324.2 — 154.0 15.2 —
Urban Credit Cooperatives 119.0 101.0 66.4 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives — 1,987.0 1,393.0 — —
2001
Big Four Banks 13,000.0 10,770.0 7,400.0 23.0 25.37
Other Commercial Banks 3,259.0 2,530.7 1,649.8 12.9 —
1) Joint Equity 2,386.0 1,849.0 1,224.0 10.5 12.94
2) City Commercial Banks 873.0 681.7 425.8 2.4 —
Foreign Banks 373.4 — 153.2 1.7 —
Urban Credit Cooperatives 128.7 107.1 72.5 2.6 —
Rural Credit Cooperatives — 1,729.8 1,197.0 — —
Table 3-B Notes:
1. It is before tax profit up to 2006, and after tax profit from 2006-2012.
2. Big four (stated owned) banks refer to Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China. Big five banks are the Big four Banks
and the Bank of Communications.
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 2000-2012, CEIC data base, Quarterly Monetary
Report of PBOC.
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Development of Other Non-state Banks
Table 3-B provides a (partial) breakdown of the different types of
banks. Although the largest four or five banks (the fifth largest bank is the
Bank of Communications, also state-owned) dominate in every aspect of
the banking sector during the period of 2001– 2012, the role of other banks
in the entire banking sector cannot be ignored.108  Table 4-C provides evi-
dence on the growth of non-bank intermediaries.  Overall, the growth of
these non-bank intermediaries has been impressive since the late 1990s.109
Among them, “other commercial banks” (many are state-owned), RCCs,
and TICs hold the largest amount of assets; the size of foreign banks and
mutual funds (not listed in the table) is minuscule, but these are likely to
be the focus of development in the near future.110  In an effort to boost
lending to the private sector and improve competition in the banking sys-
tem, the CBRC granted private capital the same entry standards to the
banking industry as other capital in May 2012.111  The CBRC indicated
that private companies may buy into banks through private stock place-
ments, new share subscription, equity transfers, and mergers and acquisi-
tions.112 Further, private investment is also welcomed in trust, financial
leasing, and auto-financing companies.113 As a development on this front,
after the Third Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee in November
2013, the government also allowed private investors that meet certain
requirements to set up small and medium-sized banks and other financial
institutions.114  Finally, our coverage of non-bank financial institutions
excludes various forms of informal financial intermediaries, some of which
are deemed illegal but overall provide a considerable amount of financing
to firms in the Hybrid Sector.
III. Financial Markets
In this section, we examine China’s financial markets, including the
stock markets, and the recent addition of venture capital and private equity
markets as well as asset management industries.  We also compare, at the
aggregate level, how firms raise funds in China and in other emerging
economies through external markets in order to determine if China’s expe-
108. AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 64.
109. See generally AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4.
110. Postal savings, which are deposit-taking institutions affiliated with local post
offices, constitute another form of non-bank intermediation that is not reported in Table
3-B due to a lack of time series data.  However, at the end of 2008, total deposits within
the postal savings system exceeded RMB 2079 billion, or 9.5% of all deposits in China.
See MICHAEL MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42380, CHINESE BANKING SYSTEM: ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS 5 (2012).
111. See Grant Turner, Nicholas Tan & Dena Sadeghian, The Chinese Banking System,
RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA BULLETIN 57– 58 (Sept. 2012).
112. Id. at 58– 60.
113. Id.
114. See John Howkins, Guest Post: The Third Plenum and Cultural Industries, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013, 4:30 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/11/26/guest-
post-the-third-plenum-and-cultural-industries.
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rience is unique.  We then briefly review publicly traded companies’
financing and investment decisions.  Finally, we discuss the further devel-
opment of financial markets as well as corporate governance and the per-
formance of listed firms.
A. Overview of Stock Markets
After the introduction of China’s domestic stock exchanges in 1991,
the SHSE and SZSE initially underwent rapid growth.115  However, in the
long run they have not done so well.116  Figure 3 compares the perform-
ance of some of the major stock exchanges around the world, as measured
by the “buy-and-hold” return in the period January 1992 and December
2013.117  The figure plots inflation-adjusted real returns.  Over this period,
the performance of the value-weighted SHSE index (the calculation for the
SZSE is similar) is below that of the DAX (Germany), which has the best
performance among the group, and that of the S&P 500 (U.S.), FTSE
(U.K.), CAC (France), and only slightly better than the Nikkei Index
(Japan), the worst among the group.  By the end of 2013 it was at about the
same level in real terms as at the start of 1992.
Table 4-A:  A Comparison of the Largest Stock Markets in the World
in December 2013
2013 Dec
Market cap 2013 Dec
Ranking Stock Exchange US bn share turnover
1 NYSE Euronext (US) 17,950 70.9%
2 NASDAQ OMX (US) 6,085 144.6%
3 Tokyo SE Group 4,543 129.6%
4 London SE Group 4,428 46.5%
5 NYSE Euronext (Europe) 3,584 355.2%
6 Hong Kong Stock Exchange 3,101 40.9%
7 Shanghai SE 2,497 151.6%
8 TMX Group 2,114 62.6%
9 Deutsche Bo¨rse 1,936 67.8%
10 SIX Swiss Exchange 1,541 45.4%
11 Shenzhen SE 1,452 269.3%
12 Australian SE 1,387 57.7%
China (SHSE, SZSE, HKSE) 7,050 127.14%
Notes: All figures are from http//:www.world-exchanges.org, the web site of the
international organization of stock exchanges.  Turnover velocity is the total turnover of
domestic stocks for the year expressed as a percentage of the total market capitalization.
115. See Sonia L. Wong, China’s Stock Market: A Marriage of Capitalism and Socialism,
26 CATO J. 389, 389 (2006), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/seri
als/files/cato-journal/2006/11/cj26n3-1.pdf.
116. See generally Gao, supra note 11. R
117. This is the gross return at December 2013 from 1 unit of currency invested in
each of the valued-weighted stock indexes at the beginning of 1992.
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Figure 3:  A Comparison of Performance of Major Stock Indexes (Buy-
and-hold returns of $1 between Jan. 1992 and Dec. 2013)
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As Table 4-A indicates, at the end of 2013, the SHSE was ranked the
seventh largest market in the world in terms of market capitalization, while
the SZSE was ranked the eleventh.  The Hong Kong Stock Exchange
(HKSE), where selected firms from mainland China have been listed and
traded, was ranked the seventh largest in the world.  Needless to say, the
Chinese financial markets will play an increasingly important role in world
financial markets.118  Also from Table 4-A, “turnover velocity” is the annual
total turnover for all the listed firms expressed as a percentage of the total
market capitalization, and the figures for SZSE and SHSZ are among the
highest, suggesting that there is a large amount of speculative trading espe-
cially among small- and medium-cap stocks in the Chinese markets, as
these stocks are more easily manipulated than large cap stocks.119
There are two other markets established to complement the two main
exchanges.120  First, a fully electronically-operated market (“Er Ban Shi
Chang” or “Second-tier Market,” similar to the NASDAQ) for Small and
118. See Carpenter et al., supra note 13.
119. See Lily Fang, Jun Qian & Huiping Zhang, Out of the Limelight but in Play:
Trading and Liquidity of Media and Off-media Stocks 21– 22 (Jan. 28, 2012) (unpub-
lished) (on file with Social Science Research Network), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1964440.
120. See Robert Cookson, Chinese IPOs: Bumper Year Raises Expectation for 2010, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2010, 4:05 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/30665c74-0ed1-11df-
bd79-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Fae9rlpd.
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Medium Enterprises (SMEs) was opened in June 2004.121  It was designed
to lower the entry barriers for SME firms, especially newly established
firms in the high-tech industries.122  By the end of February 2007, there
were 119 firms listed in this market.123  Second, San Ban Shi Chang or
“Third-tier Market” was established to deal primarily with de-listing firms
and other over-the-counter (OTC) transactions.124  Since 2001, some pub-
licly listed firms on both SHSE and SZSE that do not meet the listing stan-
dards have been delisted and the trading of their shares shifted to this
market.125 In 2006, “New Third-tier Market” (or “Xin San Ban Shi Chang”)
was established to deal with the equity transactions of non-listed share-
holding companies’ in a high-tech zone (with the name of “Zhong Guan
Cun”) in Beijing.126  The companies on this market can be transferred to
the GEM or small and medium-sized plate if approved by the CSRC.127 On
October 23, 2009, China launched a NASDAQ-style Growth Enterprises
Market (GEM, or “Chuang Ye Ban”) with 28 companies that were mainly
from the hi-tech, electronic, and pharmaceutical industries.128  The main
purpose of GEM is to provide financing for small and medium sized private
enterprises.129  The first ten firms seeking to list on the GEM drew a com-
bined RMB 784 billion in subscriptions in September 2009, while the sec-
ond and third sets had eighteen firms, including Huayi Brothers Media,
China’s largest privately owned film company.130  In June and August
2010, the SZSE started to release the index of GEM—  ChiNext and ChiNext
Composite, respectively.131  Since 2012, the development of China’s stock
121. See Alexandra Harney & Richard McGregor, Fish Eyes and Pearls in China, FIN.
TIMES (July 5, 2004, 5:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e6bd76ca-ce21-11d8-
95cb-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3Fae9rlpd.
122. Id.
123. See Jamil Anderlini, On Asia: Renaissance Gives Shenzhen Added Stature, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2007, 4:57 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/1/a09c3ada-41d9-11dc-
8328-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3Fae9rlpd.
124. See No Flash Boys in China’s Sleepy Over-the-Counter Markets, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Apr. 14, 2014, 6:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-14/no-flash-boys-
in-china-s-sleepy-over-the-counter-markets.html.
125. See, e.g., Lydia Guo, China Cosco: More Fire Sales Ahead, FIN. TIMES (May 27,
2013, 8:55 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/05/27/china-cosco-more-fire-
sales-ahead/ (“Cosco has fallen into this special treatment category, with its trading
name changed to ‘ST Cosco.’ The ‘ST’ is a warning of delisting risk, a severe embarrass-
ment to the state-controlled company.”)
126. See Winnie Liu, China’s OTC Market: The Shortcut, ASIAN VENTURE CAPITAL J.
(May 28, 2014, 1:33 PM), http://www.avcj.com/avcj/analysis/2346915/chinas-otc-mar
ket-the-shortcut.
127. Id.
128. See Robert Cookson, Demand Swamps New Chinese Exchange, FIN. TIMES (Oct.
30, 2009, 4:21 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4ca1ac3c-c56f-11de-8193-00144
feab49a.html#axzz3Fae9rlpd. Note that GEM is also commonly referred to as “ChiNext.”
See Emma Saunders, Economic News Digest, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2009, 1:20 PM), http://
blogs.ft.com/money-supply/2009/11/02/economic-news-digest-16/.
129. See Cookson, supra note 128.
130. See Saunders, supra note 128.
131. Wei Shen, Face Off: Is China a Preferred Regime for International Private Equity
Investments - Decoding a China Myth from the Chinese Company Law Perspective, 26 CONN.
J. INT’L L. 89, 145 (2011).
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market has been accelerated.132  On July 8, 2012, the State Council
approved the National Equities Exchange and Quotations to extend the
“new third-tier market” to a nation-wide market in Beijing, Tianjin, Shang-
hai, and Wuhan.133  On December 14, 2013, the State Council finally
decided to enlarge the volume of the new third-tier market, allowing all
kinds of small and medium enterprises to do equity transactions on this
market.134  Other recent developments in the stock market include the
pilot of preference shares and the possible IPO transformation from an
approval-based system to a registration-based system.135  Preference shares
are a mature species in the stock market of developed countries, whereas in
China they were just promoted soon after the Third Plenary Session in
November 2013.136  Thus, the pilot program has been seen as a major
innovation in China’s stock market.137  First, the pilot helps to accelerate
the development of direct financing and to provide investors with more
diversified investment channels.138  Second, it helps commercial banks to
innovate capital instruments to meet regulatory capital requirements, as
the issue of preference shares is included in Tier-1 capital.139  The other
surprisingly aggressive reform in November 2013 for the stock market was
a pledge by the central government to turn the current approval-based sys-
tem of IPOs into a registration-based one, potentially removing a stumbling
block that has distorted supply and demand, and artificially inflated valua-
tions of new stock offerings.140  The approval-based system has long been
criticized as one of the fundamental deficiencies in China’s stock
132. See generally Josh Noble, China’s Shenzhen index outshines Shanghai, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3df78366-0317-11e3-9a46-00144feab7
de.html#axzz3Fae9rlpd.
133. Lan Xinzhen, Expansion of the new third board will ease financing woes, CHINA
(Jan. 3, 2014) http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2014-01/03/content_31079761.htm.
134. CSRC Implements the State Council Decisions on Relevant Matters Concerning
National SME Share Transfer System, Marking Major Progress in the Development of Multi-
tiered Capital Markets, CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMM’N (Dec. 14, 2013), available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201401/t20140126_243284.html.
135. CSRC Implements the State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Launching the Pilot Pro-
gram for Preferred Shares, CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMM’N (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www
.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201402/t20140211_243686.html; CSRC
Releases Opinions on Further Promoting the IPO System Reform, CHINA SEC. REGULATORY
COMM’N (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/2014
02/t20140214_243817.html.
136. CSRC Implements the State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Launching the Pilot Pro-
gram for Preferred Shares, supra note 135.
137. Cai Xiao, CSRC announces rules for preferred company shares, CHINA DAILY, Mar.
22, 2014, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2014-03/22/content_15126525
.html.
138. CSRC Implements the State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Launching the Pilot Pro-
gram for Preferred Shares, supra note 135.
139. Id.
140. Q&A by CSRC Spokesperson on the Opinions on Further Promoting the IPO System
Reform, CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMM’N  (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/
csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201401/t20140108_242271.html.
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market.141
Despite rapid recent development in China’s stock market, there is evi-
dence that the market is still not efficient because prices and investor
behavior are not necessarily driven by the fundamental values of listed
firms.142  For example, Morck et al. find that stock prices are more “syn-
chronous” in the sense that stock prices move up and down together in
emerging countries like China than in developed countries.143  They attri-
bute this phenomenon to poor minority investor protection and the imper-
fect regulation of markets in emerging countries.144  In addition, there have
been numerous lawsuits alleging insider trading and manipulation.145  In
many cases, unlike well-known companies in developed markets stricken
by corporate scandals like Enron, managers and other insiders from Chi-
nese companies did not use any sophisticated accounting and finance
maneuvers, even by China’s standards, to hide their losses.146  These cases
reveal that the inefficiencies in the Chinese stock markets can be partially
attributed to poor and ineffective regulation.147  We discuss below issues
relating to regulation, market efficiency, and the further development of
China’s financial markets.
B. Overview of Bond Markets
Table 4-B provides information on China’s bond markets.  The govern-
ment bond market had an annual growth rate of 22.2% during the period
of 1990-2012 in terms of newly issued bonds, while total outstanding
bonds reached RMB 7,199.36 billion (or $1137.7 billion) by the end of
2012.148  The second largest component of the bond market is called “pol-
icy financial bonds.”  These bonds are issued by “policy banks,” which
operate under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance; the proceeds of
bond issuance are invested in government-run projects and industries,
such as infrastructure construction (similar to municipal bonds in the
United States).149  Compared to government-issued bonds, the size of the
corporate bond market is relatively small.  However, it has been growing
quickly in recent years.150  In terms of the amount of outstanding bonds,
141. Shen Hong et al., Reforms Could Put China’s IPO Market Back in Business (Nov.
15, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/11/15/reforms-could-put-chinas-
ipo-market-back-in-business/.
142. Franklin Allen et al., Law, Institutions and Finance in China and India, in EMERG-
ING GIANTS 137 (Barry Eichengree et al. eds, Oxford University Press, 2010).
143. Randall Morck et al.,The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging
Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, THE NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/china/shangmorck.pdf (last visited Oct 8, 2014).
144. Id. at 2.
145. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Meijun Qian & Mengxin Zhao, Review of China’s
Financial System and Initiatives for the Future 21 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper
No. 08-28, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1185877.
146. Id. at 21.
147. Id. at 22.
148. See infra Table 4-B.
149. See Allen, supra note 145, at 22.
150. Id.; see also Michelle Leung, The Rise of China’s Corporate Bond Market, S&P
DOW JONES INDICES, MCGRAW HILL FINANCIAL INDEXOLOGY BLOG 1 (June 18, 2014, 10:30
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the size of the corporate bond market was less than one fourth of the size of
the government bond market in 2008, and has grown to around 63% by
2012.151
The small size of the bond market, especially the corporate bond mar-
ket, relative to the stock market, is common among Asian countries.152
AQQ (2008) compares different components (bank loans to the private sec-
tors or the Hybrid Sector of China; stock market capitalization; public/
government and private/corporate bond markets) of the financial markets
around the world at the end of 2003.153  Compared to Europe and the U.S.,
we found that the size of both the government (public) and corporate (pri-
vate) bond markets is smaller in Asia (Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia,
Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand), excluding Japan;
even in Japan, the size of the corporate bond market is much smaller com-
pared with its government bond market.154  We also found that the size of
all four components of China’s financial markets are small relative to that
of other regions and countries, including bank loans made to the Hybrid
Sector (private sector) in China (other countries).155  Moreover, the most
under-developed component of China’s financial markets is the corporate
bond market (labeled “private” bond market).156
C. Evidence on the Listed Sector
In this section, we briefly examine publicly listed and traded compa-
nies in China.  It is worthwhile to first clarify that firms from the Hybrid
Sector can become listed and publicly traded.157  AQQ (2005) found that
80% of their sample of more than 1,100 listed firms were converted from
former SOEs.158  In recent years, the government has attempted to change
the composition of listed firms by relaxing regulations toward Hybrid Sec-
tor firms, including the establishment of the recently opened GEM.159
PM), http://www.spindices.com/documents/education/practice-essentials-rise-of-chi
nas-corporate-bond-market.pdf.
151. Franklin Allen et al., China’s Financial System: Opportunities and Challenges, 70
tbl.5-B (Nat’l Bureau of Int’l Research, Working Paper No. 17828, 2012), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17828.
152. As the IPO was suspended from October 2012 to December 2013, the total
amount of the enterprise bonds issued (RMB 649.9 billion) in 2012 surpassed the total
amount of capital raised in the domestic stock market (RMB 585.0 billion) for the first
time in recent years. Id.; see also Allen, supra note 145, at 56 tbl.1.
153. Allen et. al, supra note 145, at 56 tbl. 1.
154. Id. at 56, 58 tbls.1 & 3-A pnls.A & B.
155. Id. at 56, 58, 61, 67 tbls.1, 3-A & 5-A figs. 4-A, 4-B, 4-C & 4-D.
156. Id. at 62 tbl.5-B.
157. Yoˇuxia`n Ze´re`n Go¯ngs¯ı She`l`ı De¯ngj`ı Tı´jia¯o Ca´ilia`o Gu¯ıfa`n
( ), [The Establishment of a Limited Liability Com-
pany Registered to Submit Material Specification] (promulgated SAIC Enterprise Regis-
tration Bureau) (SAIC)(China), available at http://www.saic.gov.cn/ywbl/bszn/nzdjzn/
gsdjtjclgf/201402/t20140228_142367.html.
158. AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 81, 111 tbl.8-A pnl.B.
159. Xinhua, China’s Nasdaq-style GEM starts trading, SINA ENGLISH (Oct. 30, 2009),
http://english.sina.com/business/p/2009/1029/281487.html; Wa´ng Xıˆn ( ),
Chua`ngye` Baˇn Zho¯ngyu´ Za`i She¯nzhe`n Shaˇn Lia`ng Ka¯ibaˇn ( )
[GEM has finally opened in Shenzhen, shiny plate] SHENZHEN SPECIAL ZONE DAILY (Oct. 24,
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Until the share reform announced in 2005 and implemented in
2006– 2007, listed firms in China issued both tradable and non-tradable
shares (Table 5-A).160  The non-tradable shares were either held by the gov-
ernment or by other state-owned legal entities (i.e., other listed or non-
listed firms or organizations).161  Table 5-B shows that, in 2009, non-trad-
able shares constituted around half of all shares (53%, column 2), but fell
rapidly from 2010 to 2012.162  By the end of 2012, the non-tradable shares
constituted around 24% of all shares, and the rest majority of tradable
shares were Class A shares.163  Among the tradable shares, Class A and B
shares are listed and traded in either the SHSE or SZSE. Originally, Class A
shares were issued to and traded by Chinese investors while Class B shares
were issued to and traded by foreign investors including those from Taiwan
and Hong Kong and QFIIs.164  While the two share classes issued by the
same firm are identical in terms of shareholder rights (e.g. voting and divi-
dend rights), B shares were traded at a significant discount relative to A
shares and were traded less frequently than A shares.165  The “B share dis-
count” has been reduced significantly since the CSRC allowed Chinese citi-
zens to invest and trade B shares with foreign currency accounts in
2001.166  In addition, Class H shares, issued by companies registered in
mainland China and approved by the CSRC to get listed in HK, are traded
on the HKSE.167  Finally, there are N shares and S shares for firms listed in
the U.S. and Singapore but operating in China (we omit discussions on
these shares since they are not listed on the domestic exchanges).168  After
the share reforms discussed below government shares became G shares
and are tradable.
2009), http://www.szse.cn/main/aboutus/bsyw/39740769.shtml; see also Cookson,
supra note 128.
160. Andrea Beltratti, Bernardo Bortolotti & Marianna Caccavaio, The Stock Market
Reaction to the 2005 Non-Tradable Share Reform in China 7– 8 (ECB Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 1339, May 2011), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
scpwps/ecbwp1339.pdf.
161. Id. at 8.
162. See infra Table 5-B.
163. Id.
164. Beltratti et al., supra note 160, at 10; see also Jianping Mei, Jos´e A. Scheinkman & R
Wei Xiong, Speculative Trading and Stock Prices: Evidence from Chinese A-B Share Premia,
10-2 ANNALS OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 225, 234– 36 (2009).
165. Mei, Scheinkman & Xiong, supra note 164, 234– 236 & tbl.1.  Explanations of R
the B share discount include: 1) Foreign investors face higher information asymmetry
than domestic investors, 2) lower B share prices compensate for the lack of liquidity
(due to low trading volume), and 3) the A share premium reflects a speculative bubble
component among domestic investors.
166. See id.
167. Dennis Hudachek, The Complete Guide To Chinese Share Classes, ETF.COM: WHITE
PAPERS (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.etf.com/sections/white-papers/15113-the-complete-
guide-to-chinese-share-classes.html?showall=&fullart=1&start=5.
168. Id.; see also Yap Lian Seng & Qiu Yang, Making SGX Attractive to S-Chips, LEX-
OLOGY STAMFORD LAW CORPORATION (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=0db983fc-6c21-4e52-b1c3-9e3c7c08266a.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN301.txt unknown Seq: 36 30-JAN-15 8:42
534 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
Table 5-A:  Types of Common Stock Issued in China
Tradable? Definition
No State-owned Shares that are controlled by the central government
(Private shares* during the process when firms are converted into a
block (G shares limited liability corporation but before listing.  These
transfer after recent shares are either managed and represented by the
possible) reform and Bureau of National Assets Management or held by
tradable) other state-owned companies, both of which also
appoint firms’ board members.  After reforms
announced in 2005 and implemented in 2006-7
state shares became G shares and are tradable.
Entrepreneur’s Shares reserved for firms’ founders during the same
shares process described above; different from shares that
founders can purchase and sell in the markets.
Foreign Shares owned by foreign industrial investors during
owners the same process
Legal entity Shares sold to legal identities (such as other
holders companies, listed or non-listed) during the same
process.
Employee Shares sold to firm’s employees during the same
shares process.
Yes A Shares Shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed
(Newly and traded in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock
issued Exchange; most of these shares are sold to and held
shares) by Chinese (citizen) investors.
B Shares Shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed
and traded in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock
Exchange; these shares are sold to and held by
foreign investors; starting in 2001Chinese investors
can also trade these shares.
H Shares Shares issued by selected Chinese companies listed
and traded in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; these
shares can only be traded on the HK Exchange but
can be held by anyone.
*: There are sub-categories under this definition
We next describe standard corporate governance mechanisms in the
Listed Sector.  First, according to the 2005 Company Law, listed firms in
China have a two-tier board structure: the Board of Directors (five to
nineteen members) and the Board of Supervisors (at least three members),
with supervisors ranking above directors.169  The main duty of the Board
of Supervisors is to monitor firms’ operations as well as the activities of top
managers and directors; the board consists mostly of representatives of
shareholders and employees, with the rest of the board represented by
either officials chosen from government branches or executives from the
169. Gongsi Fa ( ) [Companies Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Con-
gress of the People’s Republic of China, Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) Ch. IV
§§ 3,4 Arts. 109, 118 (China) available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/Legislations
Form2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21898292.htm.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN301.txt unknown Seq: 37 30-JAN-15 8:42
2014 China’s Financial System and the Law 535
Table 5-B:   Tradable vs. Non-tradable Shares for China’s Listed
Companies
Shanghai SE: Non-
State/total tradable/ Tradable/ A/total A/Tradable
Year shares total shares total shares shares shares*
1992 0.41 0.69 0.31 0.16 0.52
1993 0.49 0.72 0.28 0.16 0.57
1994 0.43 0.67 0.33 0.21 0.64
1995 0.39 0.64 0.36 0.21 0.60
1996 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.22 0.62
1997 0.32 0.65 0.35 0.23 0.66
1998 0.34 0.66 0.34 0.24 0.71
1999 0.43 0.65 0.35 0.26 0.75
2000 0.44 0.64 0.36 0.28 0.80
2001 0.50 0.64 0.36 0.29 0.80
2002 0.52 0.65 0.35 0.26 0.74
2003 0.57 0.64 0.35 0.27 0.76
2004 0.58 0.64 0.36 0.28 0.77
2005 0.57 0.62 0.38 0.30 0.78
2006 0.36 0.65 0.35 0.27 0.81
2007 0.37 0.69 0.31 0.28 0.90
2008 0.47 0.58 0.42 0.37 0.91
2009 0.49 0.53  0.47 0.50 0.98
2010 — 0.32 0.68 0.58 —
2011 — 0.26 0.74 0.61 —
2012 — 0.24 0.76 0.64 —
^: Non-tradable shares include “state-owned” and “shares owned by legal entities”;
This column is calculated as “(Non-tradable in Shanghai SE+ Non-tradable in Shenzhen
SE)/(Market cap in Shanghai SE + Market cap in Shenzhen SE)”
*: tradable shares include A, B, and H shares;
Source: China Security Regulation Committee Reports (2000-2006), CEIC database and
http://www.csrc.gov.cn
parent companies; directors and top managers of the firms cannot hold
positions as supervisors.170  The company has the discretion to decide the
number of representatives of employees on the Board of Supervisors, but
representatives of employees must account for at least one third of the
board.171  The Board of Directors serves similar duties as its counterpart in
the U.S., including appointing and firing CEOs.172  According to the “one-
share, one-vote” scheme adopted by firms in the Listed Sector, shareholders
including the state and legal person shareholders that typically own the
majority of shares appoint the board members.173  Specifically, the Chair-
man and one or two Vice Chairmen of the Board are elected by the remain-
ing directors who have the majority of votes; with the approval of the Board,
the CEO and other top managers can become members of the Board.174
The CSRC requires at least one third of the board and a minimum of two
170. See id. at Chs. II, IV §§ 2,4 Arts. 54, 118– 19.
171. See id. at Ch. IV §§ 3,4 Arts. 109, 118.
172. See id. at Arts. 47, 109.
173. See id. at Arts. 104, 106, 130.
174. See id. at Art. 110.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN301.txt unknown Seq: 38 30-JAN-15 8:42
536 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
people on the Board to be independent.175
Since the law does not specify that every member of the Board must be
elected by shareholders during general shareholder meetings, in practice
some directors are nominated and appointed by the firms’ parent compa-
nies; the nomination process is usually kept secret, particularly when nom-
inating board members for former SOEs.176  Since not all members of
either board are elected by shareholders, a major problem with the board
structure is the appointment of and contracting with the CEOs.177  Based
on firm-level compensation data which has been available since 1998 due
to disclosure requirements, Fung et al. (2003) and Kato and Long (2004)
concluded that no listed firms grant stock options to CEOs or board mem-
bers.178  The situation is somewhat different now.179 Among overseas
listed SOEs, barriers to exercising stock options have been overcome, and
some senior executives have been granted stock options and have received
substantial rewards; examples include the former chairman of CNOOC
Wei Liucheng and Bank of China-Hong Kong former chairman Liu
Mingkang (Caijing Magazine, 2008). However, the cash-based compensa-
tion level for CEOs is still much lower than the compensation level for their
counterparts in developed countries, and the consumption of perks, such
as company cars, is prevalent.180
Second, the existing ownership structure, characterized by the large
amount of non-tradable shares including cross-holdings of shares among
listed companies and institutions, makes it difficult for value-increasing
M&As.181  In many deals, a Hybrid Sector non-listed firm acquires a listed
firm that is converted from an SOE, but the large amount of non-tradable
shares held by the state remain intact after the transaction.182  Such an
acquisition can be the means through which low quality, non-listed compa-
nies bypass listing standards and access financial markets (e.g., Du et al.,
2008).
175. Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of
Listed Companies (Zhengjianfa [2001] No. 102) (promulgated by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission, Aug. 16, 2001), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/news
facts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.html (China).
176. STOYAN TENEV, CHUNLIN ZHANG & LOUP BREFORT, WORLD BANK AND INT’L FIN.
CORP., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE INSTITU-
TIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 91 (2002).
177. See ALEX BRYSON, JOHN FORTH & MINGHAI ZHOU, CTR. FOR ECON. PERFORMANCE,
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT CHINA’S CEOS? EVIDENCE FROM ACROSS THE WHOLE ECONOMY
2 (2012).
178. Takao Kato & Cheryl Long, Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Cor-
porate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzen Stock
Exchanges 17 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 1767, 2005).
179. See generally Wen Xiu & Ming Shuliang, China’s Execs Sweating Over Stock
Options, CAIJING.COM.CN (June 27, 2008, 4:35 PM), http://english.caijing.com.cn/2008-
06-27/100071919.html.
180. See Kato & Long, supra note 178 at 16, 18. R
181. See Julan Du, Oliver M. Rui & Sonia M.L. Wong, Financing-Motivated Mergers and
Acquisitions: Evidence from Corporate China 2– 3 (Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong, Working
Paper, 2008).
182. Id. at 7– 8.
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Third, one factor contributing to the occurrence of corporate scandals
is the lack of institutional investors (including non-depository financial
intermediaries) as they are a recent addition to the set of financial institu-
tions in China.183  Professional investors would perhaps not be so easily
taken in by simple deceptions.184  Another factor is that the enforcement of
laws is questionable due to the lack of legal professionals and
institutions.185
Fourth, the government plays the dual roles of regulator and
blockholder for many listed firms, including banks and financial services
companies.186  The main role of the CSRC, whose functional counterpart
in the U.S. is the SEC, is to monitor and regulate stock exchanges and listed
companies.187  The government exercises its shareholder control rights in
listed firms through the Bureau of National Assets Management, which
holds large fractions of nontradable shares, or other SOEs (with holdings
of non-tradable shares).188  Moreover, the government’s dual roles can lead
to conflicting goals, such as maximizing profits as shareholder versus max-
imizing social welfare as regulator or social planner, in dealing with listed
firms, which in turn weaken the effectiveness of both of the government’s
roles.189  Based on a sample of 625 firms with 28% of the CEOs being ex-
or current government bureaucrats, Fan et al. (2007) find that the three-
year post-IPO average stock returns of the sample underperform the market
by 20%, and the underperformance of firms with such politically-con-
nected CEOs exceeds those without politically-connected CEOs by almost
30%.190  Firms with politically-connected CEOs are also more likely to
appoint other bureaucrats, and not personnel with relevant professional
experience to boards of directors.191
183. See TENEV ET. AL., supra note 176, at 81, 111, 113. R
184. See Joseph D. Piotroski & T.J. Wong, Institution and Information Environment of
Chinese Listed Firms, in CAPITALIZING CHINA 201 (Joseph P.H. Fan & Randall Morck, eds.,
2013).
185. Yi Zhang, Law, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Scandal in an Emerging
Economy: Insights from China 9– 11 (Peking Univ., Working Paper, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=957549.
186. Katharina Pistor, The Governance of China’s Finance, in CAPITALIZING CHINA 35,
37– 38 (Joseph P.H. Fan & Randall Morck, eds., 2013).
187. About CSRC, CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMM’N (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.csrc
.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about.
188. Main Functions and Responsibilities of SASAC, STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION
AND ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION (SASAC) (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.sasac.gov.cn/
n2963340/n2963393/2965120.html.
189. See Pistor, supra note 186, at 41, for a description of the complicated relation- R
ships among various regulatory agencies and the central government branches, and how
these relationships affect the decision-making process of regulations and enforcement.
190. Joseph P.H. Fan & T.J. Wong, Politically-connected CEOs, Corporate Governance
and Post-IPO Performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms, 4, 33 (Chinese
Univ. of Hong Kong, Working Paper, 2004).
191. Id. at 24.
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D. Private Equity/Venture Capital and the Funding of New Industries
Allen and Gale (1999, 2000a) have suggested that stock market-based
economies, such as the U.K. in the 19th century and the U.S. in the 20th
century, have been more successful in developing new industries than
intermediary-based economies such as Germany and Japan.192  They argue
that markets are better than banks for funding new industries, because
evaluation of these industries based on experience is difficult, and there is
wide diversity of opinion.193  Stock market-based economies such as the
U.S. and U.K. also tend to have well-developed systems for the acquisition
and distribution of information, so the cost of information to investors is
low.194  Markets then work well because investors can gather information
at low costs and those that anticipate high profits can provide the finance
to the firms operating in the new industries.195
A key part of this process is the private equity and venture capital
sector.196  Venture capitalists are able to raise large amounts of funds in the
U.S. because of the prospect that successful firms will be able to undertake
an IPO.197  With data from 21 countries, Jeng and Wells (2000) found that
venture capital is less important in other countries, and the existence of an
active IPO market is the critical determinant of the importance of venture
capital in a country.198  This is consistent with the findings of Black and
Gilson (1998); after comparing the U.S. and Germany, Black and Gilson
found that the primary reason venture capital is relatively successful in the
U.S. is because of the active IPO market.199
These facts imply that the development of active venture capital and
private equity markets can increase the financing for China’s new indus-
tries.200  What is unusual about China is that it currently has the ability to
develop both traditional industries, such as manufacturing, and in the near
future new, high-tech industries, such as aerospace, computer software,
semiconductors, and bio-genetics.201  China’s development is different
192. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Diversity of Opinion and Financing of New
Technologies, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 68, 68– 70 (1999) [hereinafter New Technologies];
Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Diversity of Opinion and Resource Allocation, in COMPAR-
ING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 403, 406 (2000) [hereinafter Resource Allocation].
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture
Capital on Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 674– 75 (2000) (analyzing venture capital
funding’s positive affect on patenting industry); see also Leslie A. Jeng & Philippe C.
Wells, The Determinants of Venture Capital Funding: Evidence Across Countries, 6 J. CORP.
FIN. 241, 242 (2000).
197. See Jeng & Wells, supra note 196, at 242; see also Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. R
Gibson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Bank versus Stock Markets,
47 J. F. ECON. 243, 245 (1998).
198. See Jeng & Wells, supra note 196, at 241. R
199. See Black & Gibson, supra note197, at 245– 46.
200. See Jeng & Wells, supra note 196, at 245 (“The past performance of venture R
capital-backed companies shows that venture capital has been very successful at backing
companies with innovative technologies and tremendous growth potential.”)
201. See Allen et al., supra note 145, at 34.
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from the experience of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s and that of
most other emerging economies in the 1990s, because the latter countries
focused on developing manufacturing industries first.202  In relation to
developing traditional industries like Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s,
China has already followed suit in first introducing advanced203 technolo-
gies from developed countries and “nationalizing” these technologies
within designated companies before moving toward the more advanced
technologies.204  Allen and Gale (1999, 2000a) argue that banks are better
than financial markets for funding mature industries because there is wide
agreement on how they are best managed, so the delegation of the invest-
ment decision to a bank works well.205  This delegation process, and the
economies of scale in information acquisition through delegation, makes
bank-based systems more efficient in terms of financing the growth in
these industries.206  Therefore, the banking system can contribute more in
supporting the growth and development of these industries than
markets.207
E. Asset Management Industries
The mutual fund industry in China has gone through three stages of
development.208  The first stage is between 1992, when China’s first fund
LiuBo was established, and 1997, when the first version of the mutual fund
regulation was drafted and passed by the CSRC.209  The LiuBo Fund was a
closed-end fund with NAV RMB100 million RMB ($12.5 million) and
began to trade on the SHSE in 1993.210  While the industry experienced
fast growth in the few years after 1992, lack of regulation and problems
associated with fund trading hampered the further development of the
industry.211  The first open-end fund Hua An Chuangxin was established in
September of 2001, following the announcement of the proposal for open-
end fund investment by the CSRC, a milestone for China’s mutual fund
industry.212
Figure 4 shows the development of the mutual fund industry in China.
The total net assets value increased from RMB 11 billion ($1.3 billion) in
1998 to about RMB 2.80 trillion ($456.6 billion) in the fourth quarter of
2013.213  In 2001, the NAV of all funds was about 0.8% of GDP and 1.19%
of total national savings; these figures rose to 5.39% of GDP and 10.56% of
202. Id.
203. That is advanced relative to domestic companies but not the most advanced
technologies.
204. Id.
205. See New Technologies, supra note 192, at 68– 70; Resource Allocation, supra note R
192, at 405. R
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Allen et al., supra note 145.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Allen et al., supra note 145, at 7.
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total savings in 2012.214  The growth of open-end funds contributed to
most of the growth in the industry.215  The most popular investment style
is actively managed domestic equity, with only a few index funds and
exchange traded funds (ETFs).216
Figure 4:  Growth in China’s Mutual Fund Industry (1998– 2013)
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Many mutual fund companies are owned by securities and other
financial services companies.217  Like their counterparts in the U.S., man-
agement fees are the major source of income for fund companies, account-
ing for about 80% of total income.218  Administration fees account for 9%
of total income, and the rest of the income comes from investment and
other incomes.219  More than half of the fund managers have a master-level
or higher academic degree, and the majority of them are 36 to 45 years
old.220
The first fund managed by a qualified foreign institutional investor
(QFII) was set up in 2002.221 The State Administration of Foreign
214. Id. at 35.
215. Id.
216. Allen et al., supra note 145, at 35.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Keith Robinson et al., The Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor Program in
China-Recent Developments, New Opportunities and Ongoing Challenges, 20 THE INVEST-
MENT LAWYER 1 (2013).
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Exchange (SAFE) is the government agent that regulates the QFII funds.222
The QFII Act allows foreign investors to invest in Chinese securities, with
the intention of introducing sophisticated foreign investors to the Chinese
market and with the hope that their presence would improve market effi-
ciency.223  In addition, with the exercise of their shareholder rights, the
presence of foreign investors can also help improve corporate governance
of the Listed Sector.224  However, the original QFII rules imposed restric-
tions on foreign investors, such as a capital lock-up period of one to three
years limiting capital withdrawal (and leaving China) and other operating
restrictions.225  In August 2006, the CSRC revised QFII rules to promote
more participation from foreign investors.226  Under the new rules, there
has been a significant increase in applications from foreign investors for
QFII quotas.227
Most of the institutions in the first group of QFII applicants were
securities companies and investment banks, with other financial services
companies such as insurance companies and pension fund companies also
on the list.228  By the end of July 2006, China had approved a total of
$7.495 billion foreign investment capital quota from 45 QFIIs, or three
quarters of the then ceiling of $10 billion capital inflow through QFIIs.229
In December 2007, the investment quota tripled, rising from $10 billion to
$30 billion.230  In September 2009, draft rules were issued by SAFE to
increase the upward limit of investment for an individual QFII institution
to $1 billion from the previous $800 million.231 As of November 2013,
there were a total of 251 approved QFIIs operating in China.232  With the
development of RMB internationalization, RMB Qualified Foreign Institu-
tional Investors (RMBFII) was approved by the State Council in August
2011, allowing foreign institutional investors to invest in domestic securi-
ties market within an approved quota.233 The initial quota was RMB 20
billion ($3.2 billion) in January 2012 and was increased to RMB 144.6 bil-
222. Id. at 2.
223. Id.
224. Allen et al., supra note 145, at 35.
225. Id.
226. See Y. Nancy Yi, China’s Capital Flow Regulation: The Qualified Foreign Investor
and the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor Programs, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. 299,
300 (2009).
227. See generally id.
228. See Robinson et al., supra note 221, at 2. R
229. Allen et al., supra note 145, at 35.
230. Id. at 35– 36.
231. Allen et al., supra note 145, at 36.
232. Report, List of QFIIs (Until November 2013), CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMM’N
(Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/OpeningUp/RelatedLists/QFIIs/
201401/t20140120_242787.htm.
233. China Expands RQFII, QFII Investment Quota, CHINA DAILY USA (Apr. 3, 2012),
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-04/03/content_14976215.htm; China’s
Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII) Pilot Scheme Expanded, ALLEN
& OVERY (May 10, 2013), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/China
%E2%80%99s-Renminbi-qualified-foreign-institutional.aspx.; YONG ZHEN, supra note 50, R
at 250.
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lion ($23.3 billion) in November 2013.234
The approval of qualified domestic institutional investors (QDII) to
invest in overseas markets came after QFII, in July 2006.235  The QDII
funds invest in stocks, bonds, real estate investment trusts and other main-
stream financial products in markets such as New York, London, Tokyo
and Hong Kong.236  Similar to the QFII scheme, it is a transitional arrange-
ment that provides limited opportunities for domestic investors to access
foreign markets at a stage in which a country/territory’s currency is not
freely convertible and capital flows are restricted.237  As of early 2008, ten
fund companies had obtained the approval to launch QDII.238 The total
number of QDII funds reached 75 in July 2009.239  The performance of the
QDII funds has been less than stellar.240  Going forward, the probable con-
tinuing appreciation of the RMB against major international currencies
including the dollar is a major concern for QDII investors.241
IV. The Shadow Financial Sector and Evidence on Hybrid Sector
Firms
In this section we study how the shadow financial sector supports
firms in the Hybrid Sector to raise funds and to grow from start-ups to
successful industry leaders.  We also examine the alternative governance
mechanisms employed by investors and firms that can substitute for formal
corporate governance mechanisms.  Due to data limitations, much of this
evidence is by necessity in the form of anecdotes or the results of a
survey.242
We first compare the Hybrid Sector with the State and Listed Sectors
to highlight the importance of its status in the entire economy in Section
IV.A.  Second, we consider survey evidence in Section IV.B.  Finally, Sec-
tion IV.C provides discussions and comparisons of alternative financing
channels and governance mechanisms that support the growth of the
234. China Expands RQFII, QFII Investment Quota, supra note 260; RICHARD MAZ-
ZONCHI ET AL., KWM CONNECT: QFII AND RQFII- A PRACTICAL INSIGHT TO RECENT DEVEL-
OPMENTS 2 (2013); Xie Yu, Investors Brace for Bullish Market, CHINA DAILY USA, (Dec. 10,
2013), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-12/10/content_17164724.htm;
YONG ZHEN, supra note 50, at 250. R
235. JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 49 (2009).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Allen et al., AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 117.
240. Aidan Yao & Honglin Wang, What are the Challenges and Problems Facing
China’s Outward Portfolio Investment: Evidence from the Qualified Domestic Institutional
Investor Scheme 1 (Hong Kong Inst. for Monetary Research, Working Paper No. 31/2012,
2012).
241. See id. at 5.
242. All firms including Hybrid Sector firms must disclose accounting and financial
information to the local Bureau of Commerce and Industry that audits most reports.
However, these data are then aggregated into the Statistical Yearbook without any firm-
level publications. See AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 122.
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Hybrid Sector versus formal financing channels (through banks and mar-
kets) and governance mechanisms (laws and courts).
A. Comparison of Hybrid Sector vs. State and Listed Sectors
Figure 5-A compares the level and growth of industrial output pro-
duced in the State and Listed Sectors combined vs. that of the Hybrid Sec-
tor from 1998 to 2012.243  The output from the Hybrid Sector has been
steadily increasing during this period and exceeded that of the other two
sectors in 1998.  The total output in 2011 is almost $11,444 billion for the
Hybrid Sector, while it is around $4,812 billion in the State and Listed
Sectors combined.244  The Hybrid Sector grew at an annual rate of over
30% between 1998 and 2011, while the State and Listed Sectors combined
grew at around 20% during the same period.245  In addition, the growth
rates for investment in fixed assets of these sectors are comparable (China
Statistics Yearbooks; and AQQ (2005)), which implies that the Hybrid Sec-
tor is more productive than the State and Listed Sectors.  In fact, with large
samples of firms (from sources) with various ownership structures, Liu
(2007) and Dollar and Wei (2007) find that the returns to capital figure is
much higher in non-state sectors than the State Sector, and that a capital
reallocation from state to private sectors will generate more growth in the
economy.246  Fan et al. (2006) and Li et al. (2007) find that state-owned
firms in China have a much easier access to the debt market and accord-
ingly higher leverage than non-state firms.247  One reason for the differ-
ences is that due to government protection (for economic and social/
political reasons) the costs for bankruptcy and financial distress are much
lower for state-owned firms.248  These firms also have easier access to
bank loans, especially credit extended by state-owned banks.249
243. China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) revised its total industrial output
statistics in the 2000 Yearbook without any explicit explanations. The NBS significantly
revised down outputs in previous years (i.e. 1997) compared to the 1998 Yearbook. To
be consistent and avoid confusion, we only use data from NBS after 1998.
244. Due to data limitations, our calculations underestimate the State and Listed Sec-
tors’ output. For these sectors, we used as the total output the SOE’s output and that of
listed firms for which the State has at least a fifty percent ownership stake. However, this
calculation excludes output from listed firms that are not majority owned by the State.
The output for the Hybrid Sector is the difference between the total output and the total
for the other two sectors.  However, as mentioned above, only about 20%of listed firms
do not have the State as the largest owner. Therefore, the total output for these firms is t
unlikely to change our overall conclusion about the Hybrid Sector’s dominance over the
other two sectors.
245. There is an ongoing process of privatizing SOEs. Potentially, this may bias the
growth rate in favor of the Hybrid Sector as there are firms shifting from the State Sector
to the Hybrid Sector. Yet the overwhelming majority of SOEs became Listed Sector firms
(the main channel through which SOEs were partially privatized prior to 2004). Thus,
this process is unlikely to change the validity of the results.
246. See Allen et al., supra note 48, at 123– 24.
247. Id. at 124.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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All of the above facts make the growth of the Hybrid Sector even more
impressive.  Not surprisingly, there has been a fundamental change among
the State, Listed, and Hybrid Sectors in terms of their contribution to the
entire economy. In 1980, the State Sector contributed more than two thirds
of China’s GDP and (non-agricultural) privately owned firms, a type of
Hybrid Sector firm, were negligible contributors; but in 2011, the State
Sector only contributed 15% of the GDP (China Statistical Yearbook, 1998-
2012).250  The above trend of the Hybrid Sector replacing the State Sector
is likely to continue in the near future.251
Figure 5-A: Comparing the Sectors –  Industrial Output
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Figure 5-B: Comparing the Sectors –  Employment
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Figure 5-B presents the number and growth of non-agricultural
employees in the three sectors.  The Hybrid Sector is a much more signifi-
cant source of employment opportunities than the State and Listed Sec-
tors.252  Over the period from 1990 to 2012, the Hybrid Sector employed
an average of over 73% of all non-agricultural workers; the TVEs (part of
the Hybrid Sector) have been the most important employers providing
(non-agricultural) jobs for residents in the rural areas, while (non-agricul-
tural) privately-owned firms employ more than 40% of the workforce in the
urban areas.253 Moreover, the number of employees working in the Hybrid
Sector has been growing at 5.3% over this period, while the labor force in
the State and Listed Sectors has been shrinking.254  These patterns are par-
ticularly relevant for China, given its vast population and potential problem
of unemployment.255
B. Survey Evidence
Much of the information concerning the Hybrid Sector comes from
surveys.256  We focus on evidence in AQQ (2005) and Cull and Xu (2005).
The most significant findings of these surveys regarding financing chan-
nels are the following.  First, during the startup stage, funds from foun-
ders’ family and friends are an essential source of financing.257  Banks can
also play an important role.258 Since 2010, peer-to-peer lending, which
refers to direct lending through special websites to unrelated individuals
without the involvement of any financial institution as an intermediary,
has grown rapidly.259  Second, internal financing, in the form of retained
252. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Will China’s Financial System Stimulate
or Impede the Growth of Its Economy, in 129 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT, CHINA’S ECON-
OMY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 34, 39 (Loren Brandt et al. eds., 2005), https://www2.bc
.edu/~qianju/Wilson-ChinaReport-072005.pdf.
253. Allen et al., supra note 145, at 42.
254. Our calculations of the total number of workers employed by the Hybrid Sector
actually underestimate the actual work force in the sector, because the Chinese Statistics
Yearbooks do not provide employment data for all types of firms (by ownership struc-
ture), especially small firms, in the Hybrid Sector. Id. at 36.
255. NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, Employment and Wages: 4– 1 Employment,
CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2013, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/indexeh
.htm.
256. See, e.g., NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, Employment and Wages: Brief
Introduction, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2013, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/
2013/indexeh.htm.
257. AQQ, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, supra note 1, at 60.
258. Id.
259. Takeshi Jingu, Nomura Research Inst., Risks and Opportunities in China’s Grow-
ing P2P Lending Market, 202 IAKYARA 1 (2014), http://www.nri.com/~/media/PDF/
global/opinion/lakyara/2014/lkr2014202.pdf. Since the peer-to-peer lending is still
beyond the scope of regulators, there are no official statistics on this. According to
Xinhua News, one of China’s official websites, by the end of 2012, outstanding loans on
domestic online P2P platforms stood at RMB 10 billion ($ 1.6 billion) and there were
about 200 lending platforms at that point, with about 50,000 investors. Gao Changxin,
PBOC to Set Up P2P Custodians to Prevent Fraud, XINHUANET (Nov. 27, 2013, 1:22:44
PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/business/2013-11/27/c_132922240.htm.
Since P2P online lenders have met the market’s demand for fast mini-loans, the busi-
nesses are mainly facing to those start-ups. Id. However, due to the absence of regula-
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earnings, is also important.260  During a firm’s growth period, financing
from private credit agencies (PCAs) and trade credits, rather than banks,
are key channels for firms in AQQ’s sample.261  As documented by Tsai
(2002), PCAs take on many forms, from shareholding cooperative enter-
prises run by professional money brokers, lenders, and middlemen, to
credit associations operated by a group of entrepreneurs (raising money
from group members and from outsiders to fund firms; zijin huzushe), to
pawnshops and underground private money houses.262
As far as corporate governance is concerned, when asked about what
type of losses concern them the most if the firm failed, every firm’s foun-
ders/executives (100%) included in the AQQ study said reputation loss is
a major concern, while only 60% of them said economic losses are of
major concern.263  Competition also appears to be an important factor
ensuring firms are well run.264
Cull and Xu (2005) find that firms in most regions and cities rely on
courts to resolve less than 10% of business-related disputes (the highest
percentage is 20%), with a higher reliance on courts in coastal and more
developed areas.265  One reason that firms go to courts to resolve a dispute
is because the courts are authoritative; the dispute will be resolved, even
though the resolution may not be fair (e.g., Clarke et al. 2008).266
C. Discussion on How the Shadow Financial Sector Works
In this subsection, we first discuss mechanisms within the shadow
financial sector in supporting the growth of the Hybrid Sector.  We then
compare these alternative institutions that operate outside the legal system
with the law and legal institutions that have been widely regarded as the
basis for conducting finance and commerce.  There are two aspects to alter-
native financing channels in the Hybrid Sector.267  The first is the way in
which investment is financed.268  The second is corporate governance.269
We consider each in turn.
Once a firm is established and doing well, internal finance can pro-
tions and entrance requirements, the sector is so chaotic that some local media reported
in October 2013 that at least one P2P lending company went bankrupt every day. Id.
After the Third Plenum Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, it is reported that
the PBOC is planning to introduce third-party custodians into P2P lending, after the
numerous cases of fraud emerged from 2012 to 2013. Id.
260. AQQ, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, supra note 1, at 94.
261. Id. at 94– 95.
262. KELLY S. TSAI, BACK-ALLEY BANKING: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN CHINA 37, 39 (2002).
263. AQQ, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, supra note 1, at 96.
264. Id. at 97.
265. Robert Cull & Lixin Colin Xu, Institutions, Ownership and Finance: The Determi-
nants of Profit Reinvestment Among Chinese Firms, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 126 (2005).
266. Donald Clarke, Peter Murrell & Susan Whiting, The Role of Law in China’s Eco-
nomic Development, in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375, 414 (Loren
Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008).
267. Allen et al., supra note 252.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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vide the funds necessary for growth.270  AQQ (2005) find that about 60%
of the funds raised by the Hybrid Sector are generated internally.271  Of
course, internal finance is fine once a firm is established. However, use of
this method raises the issue of how firms in the Hybrid Sector acquire their
“seed” capital, which may be the most crucial financing during a firm’s life
cycle.272  AQQ present evidence on the importance of alternative and infor-
mal channels, including funds from family and friends, and loans from
private (unofficial) credit agencies (see also Tsai (2002)).273  There is also
evidence that financing through illegal channels, such as smuggling, brib-
ery, insider trading and speculations during early stages of the develop-
ment of financial markets and real estate market, and other underground
or unofficial businesses can also play a critical role in the accumulation of
seed capital.274
Perhaps the most significant corporate governance mechanism is com-
petition in product and input markets, which has worked well in both
developed and developing countries (e.g., McMillan 1995, 1997; Allen and
Gale 2000b).275  What we see from the success of Hybrid Sector firms in
WenZhou and other surveyed firms recounted in AQQ, suggest that it is
only those firms that have the strongest comparative advantage in an
industry (of the area) that survived and thrived.  A relevant factor for com-
petition in an industry is entry barriers for new firms, as lower entry barri-
ers foster competition.  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(DLLS hereafter, 2002) examine entry barriers across 85 countries, and
find that countries with heavier (lighter) regulation of entry have higher
government corruption (more democratic and limited governments) and
larger unofficial economies.276  With much lower barriers to entry com-
pared to other countries with similar (low) per capita GDP, China is once
again an “outlier” in the DLLS sample given that China is one of the least
democratic countries, and such countries tend to have high barriers to
entry.277  Survey evidence from AQQ (2005) reveals that there exist non-
standard methods to remove entry barriers in China, which can reconcile
these seemingly contradictory facts.278
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.; see also TSAI, supra note 289.
274. Allen et al., supra note 252.
275. Chong-En Bai et al., Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China 9 (The
Williamson Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 564, 2003); Franklin Allen & Douglas
Gale, Corporate Governance and Competition, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL
AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 56– 60, 61– 62 (Xavier Vives ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2000); John McMillan, China’s Nonconformist Reforms, 11 INST. ON GLOBAL CONFLICT
AND COOPERATION 3, 4, 6, 8 (1994); John McMillan, Markets in Transition, in 2 ADVANCES
IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS (David M. Kreps & Kenneth F. Wallis eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1997).
276. Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1, 1 (2002)
277. Id. at 26– 27, 35; see also AQQ, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, supra note 1,
at 97.
278. AQQ, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, supra note 1, at 97– 99.
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Additional mechanisms of corporate governance are reputation, trust,
and relationships.279  Greif (1989, 1993) argues that certain traders’ orga-
nizations in the 11th  century were able to overcome problems of informa-
tion asymmetry and the lack of legal and contract enforcement
mechanisms, because they had developed institutions based on reputation,
implicit contractual relations, and coalitions.280  Certain aspects of the
growth of these institutions resemble what worked to promote commerce
and the financial system in China prior to 1949 (e.g., Kirby (1995)) and the
operation of the shadow financial sector today (AQQ (2005)), in terms of
how firms raise funds and contract with investors and business partners.
In addition, Greif (1993) and Stulz and Williamson (2003) point out the
importance of cultural and religious beliefs for the development of institu-
tions, legal origins, and investor protections.281
The above factors are of particular relevance and importance to
China’s development of institutions.282  Without a dominant religion,
some argue that the most important force in shaping China’s social values
and institutions is the set of beliefs first developed and formalized by
Kongzi (Confucius).283  This set of beliefs clearly defines family and social
orders, which are very different from western beliefs on how legal codes are
formulated.284  Using the World Values Survey conducted in the early
1990s, LLSV (1997b) find that China has one of the highest levels of social
trust among a group of 40 developed and developing countries.285  We
interpret high social trust in China as being influenced by Confucian
beliefs.  Throughout this paper and AQQ (2005; 2008) we have presented
evidence that reputation and relationships make many financing channels
and governance mechanisms work in China’s Hybrid Sector.
279. Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the
Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 859, 865, 881 (1989) [hereinafter Greif, Reputa-
tion and Coalitions]; Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 526, 530, 531, 544 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Greif, Contract Enforceability Institutions].
280. Greif, Reputation and Coalitions, supra note 306, at 859, 865, 881; Greif, Contract
Enforceability Institutions, supra note 306, at 526, 530, 531, 544.
281. Greif, Contract Enforceability Institutions, supra note 306, at 525; Rene´ Stulz &
Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness, and Finance, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 313, 316– 17, 346
(2003).
282. Martin King Whyte, The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or
Engine?, 45 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1, 6– 7, 8, 13, 14, 20 (1996); Geert Hof-
stede & Michael Harris Bond, The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic
Growth, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 5 (1988).
283. King Whyte, supra note 309, at 6– 7, 8, 13, 14, 20; Hofstede & Harris Bond,
supra note 309, at 5; AQQ, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, supra note 1, at 60, 97.
284. King Whyte, supra note 309, at  6– 7, 8, 13, 14, 20; Hofstede & Harris Bond,
supra note 309, at 5; AQQ, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, supra note 1, at 60, 97.
285. Interestingly, the same survey, used in LLSV (1997b), finds that Chinese citizens
have a low tendency to participate in civil activities.  However, our evidence shows that
with effective alternative mechanisms in place, citizens in the developed regions of
China have a strong incentive to participate in business and economic activities.  AQQ,
Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, supra note 1, at 97; Rafael La Porta et al., Trust in
Large Organizations, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 310, 318 (1997).
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There are other effective corporate governance mechanisms.286  First,
Burkart et al. (2003) link the degree of separation of ownership and con-
trol to different legal environments, and show that family-run firms will
emerge as the dominant form of ownership structure in countries with
weak minority shareholder protections, whereas professionally managed
firms are the optimal form in countries with strong protection.287  Survey
evidence on the Hybrid Sector in AQQ and empirical results on the Listed
Sector, along with evidence in Claessens et al. (2000, 2002) and ACDQQ
(2008), suggests that family firms are a successful norm in China and
other Asian countries.288  Second, Allen and Gale (2000a) show that, if
cooperation among different suppliers of inputs is necessary and all suppli-
ers benefit from the firm doing well, then a good equilibrium with no exter-
nal governance is possible, as internal, mutual monitoring can ensure the
optimal outcome.289  AQQ (2005) and ACDQQ (2008) present evidence
on the importance of trade credits as a form of financing for firms in the
Hybrid Sector.290  Cooperation and mutual monitoring can ensure pay-
ments (as long as funds are available) among business partners despite the
lack of external monitoring and contract enforcement.291  The importance
of trade credits is also found in other emerging economies (e.g., ACDQQ
(2012) on India) as well as in developed countries (Burkart et el. (2011) on
the U.S.).292
It is worth mentioning how entrepreneurs and investors alleviate and
overcome problems associated with government corruption.293  According
to proponents of institutional development (e.g., Rajan and Zingales
2003b; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), poor institutions, weak government,
and powerful elites can severely hinder China’s long-run economic
286. Oliver Hart, Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, 105 ECON. J.
678 (1995). Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, Family Firms 3– 4, 6, 21,
22, 37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8776, 2002).
287. Burkart et al., supra note 313, at 3– 4, 6, 21, 22, 37.
288. See, e.g., AQQ, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, supra note 1, at 89, 98; Stijn
Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Sharehold-
ings, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2743, 2750, 2769– 70 (2002); Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov &
Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58
J. FIN. ECON. 81, 82, 103, 110 (2000). Franklin Allen et al., The Financial System Capaci-
ties of China and India 22– 23, 22 n.12 (2008) (unpublished working paper) (on file with
author).
289. FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 16– 17,
375– 98 (MIT Press 2000).
290. Id. at 3, 20, 21; AQQ, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, supra note 1, at 60,
95, 98.
291. ALLEN & GALE, supra note 289, at 316– 17, 375– 98.
292. Franklin Allen et al., Financing Firms in India, 21 J. FIN. INTERMED. 409, 410, 422,
424, 441 (2012). Mariassunta Giannetti, Mike Burkart & Tore Ellingsen, What You Sell is
What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1261, 1261– 62
(2011).
293. See generally ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific,
Strategies for Business, Government, & Civil Society to Fight Corruption in Asia and the
Pacific (2009).
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growth.294  However, our evidence shows that corruption has not pre-
vented a high rate of growth for China’s firms, even in Hybrid Sector firms,
where legal protection is perhaps weaker and problems of corruption worse
compared to firms in the State and Listed sectors.295
A potentially effective solution for corruption is competition among
local governments/bureaucrats from different regions within the same
country.296  Entrepreneurs can move from region to region to find the most
supportive government officials for their private firms, which in turn moti-
vates officials to lend “helping hands” rather than “grabbing hands” in the
provision of public goods or services (e.g., granting of licenses to start-up
firms); otherwise, there would be an outflow of profitable private busi-
nesses from the region (Allen and Qian 2009).297  This remedy is typically
available in a large country with diverse regions like China.298  Comple-
menting this view, Xu (2011) reviews China’s unique institutional founda-
tion of a “regionally decentralized authoritarian system,” in which the sub-
national governments have considerable autonomous power over regional
economic decisions while simultaneously remaining under the control of
the central government.299  Under this structure, local governments play a
major role in supporting TVEs, allocating bank credits to firms, and choos-
ing good firms to get listed.300  This system alleviates the information
problem that regulators face, and creates incentives for sub-national gover-
nors though personnel control and regional competition.301  Xu argues
that this governance structure is responsible for the spectacular economic
growth of China, despite weak enforcement of formal laws.302
To summarize, the extraordinary economic performance of China in
recent decades, especially that of the Hybrid Sector, raises questions about
the conventional wisdom of using the legal system as the basis of com-
merce.303  Given the importance of legal systems to many economic sys-
tems, “Most observers would characterize the economic performance in
China and India as ‘successful despite the lack of western-style institu-
294. Gregory C. Chow, Challenges of China’s Economic System for Economic Theory, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 321 (1997); Udo C. Braendle, Tanja Gasser & Juergen Noll, Corporate
Governance in China— Is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by Guanxi?, 110 BUS. &
SOC’Y REV. 389, 400– 01, 402 (2005); Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling
Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949 (2005); RAJAN RAGHURAM & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING
CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL MARKETS TO CRE-
ATE WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY (Random House 2003).
295. AQZZ, Opportunities and Challenges, supra note 4, at 77– 78.
296. Franklin Allen & Jun Qian, Corruption and Competition 19, 20, 21, 23 (2007)
(unpublished working paper) (on file with authors).
297. Id.
298. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Chenying Zhang & Mengxin Zhao, China’s Financial
System: Opportunities and Challenges, in CAPITALIZING CHINA 46 (Joseph P.H. Fan & Ran-
dall Morck eds., 2013).
299. See Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Develop-
ment, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1078 (2011).
300. See id. at 1079.
301. See id. at 1116– 17.
302. See id. at 1077.
303. Allen et al., supra note 48, at 46.
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tions,’” and the failure to adopt western institutions will be one of the main
factors to halt the long-run economic growth.304  By contrast, Allen and
Qian (2010) argue that China’s economy has been successful because of
this lack of western-style institutions, in that conducting business outside
the legal system in fast-growing economies such as China can actually be
superior to using the law as the basis for finance and commerce.305
Focusing on dispute resolution and contract enforcement mechanisms
based on the law and courts vs. alternative mechanisms operating outside
the legal system, Allen and Qian (2010) argue that despite many well-
known advantages, there are disadvantages in using legal institutions.306
First, recent research on political economy factors, and in particular, work
by Rajan and Zingales (2003a,b), shows that rent-seeking behaviors by
vested interest groups can turn legal institutions into barriers to
changes.307  We expect these problems to be much more severe in develop-
ing countries and the costs of building good institutions can be enor-
mous.308  One way to solve this problem is not to use the law as the basis
for commerce, but instead to use alternative mechanisms outside the legal
system.309  Evidence presented in this paper and other related work on
China and other emerging economies (e.g., ACDQQ (2012) on India) sug-
gests that these alternative mechanisms can be quite effective.
Second, in democracies there can be a lengthy political process before
significant changes can be approved (by the majority of the population
and/or legislature), and the people in charge of revising the law (e.g., politi-
cians and judges) may lack the expertise of business transactions and have
limited capacity (time and effort) to examine the proposed changes.310  In
304. See Franklin Allen & Jun Qian, Comparing Legal and Alternative Institutions in
Finance and Commerce, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 1 (James Heckman
& Robert Nelson, Routledge eds., 2010).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 4– 5.
307. Id.
308. Id.  A frequently discussed and controversial topic concerns intellectual property
rights including patents and copyrights.  The practice of enforcing intellectual property
rights by courts is much more vigilant and prevalent in developed countries than in
developing countries such as China. An extensive literature in economics has found
mixed evidence on the relationship between patent/copyright protection and the pace of
innovations.  While exclusive property rights provide strong incentives for innovations
and do lead to more innovations in a few industries such as chemicals and pharmaceuti-
cals, excessive protection deters competition, which is another important factor in spur-
ring innovations. Id. at 3.
309. Id. at 5.
310. Id. at 28.  A good example is the U.S. payment system. At the beginning of the
21st century the U.S. had a 19th century system: Checks had to be physically trans-
ported from where they were deposited to a central operations center, then to the clearer,
and then back to the banks they were drawn on. Despite repeated calls for changes from
the banks and businesses, the U.S Congress did not act on this simple yet costly problem
until after September 11, 2001. All commercial flights were grounded for several days,
completely halting the check clearing process. The Check Clearing for the 21st Century
Act was signed in October 2003, allowing electronic images to be a substitute for the
original checks, and thus the clearing process is no longer dependent on the mail and
transportation system. See id. at 24– 26.
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the context of a fast-growing and frequently changing economy such as
China, Allen and Qian (2010) show that there is an additional advantage of
using alternative institutions because this type of system can adapt and
change much more quickly than when the law is used.311  In particular,
competition can ensure the most efficient mechanism prevails, avoiding a
political process that requires persuading the legislature and the electorate
to revise the law when circumstances change.312
To conclude, we argue that while legal institutions along with formal
financing channels are an integral part of developed economies’ institu-
tions, alternative mechanisms and financing channels play a much more
prominent role in emerging economies. These alternative mechanisms can
be superior to legal mechanisms in supporting business transactions in
certain industries or entire economies.313  Therefore, the development of
alternative dispute resolution and contract enforcement mechanisms along-
side the development of legal and other formal institutions can promote a
broader base of economic growth that is also more sustainable in emerging
economies.314  The coexistence of and competition between alternative
and legal mechanisms can also exert positive impact on the development of
legal institutions by promoting adaptation and preventing disproportionate
influence from interest groups.315
Summary and Concluding Remarks
One of the most frequently asked questions about China’s financial
system is whether it will stimulate or hamper its economic growth.  Our
answer to this question, based on examining the history and current status
of the financial system and comparing our findings to the financial systems
of other countries, is in three parts.  First, the large banking sector domi-
nated by state-owned banks has played a much more important role in
funding the growth of many types of firms than the financial markets.316
Second, the stock market has been growing fast since 1990, but has played
a relatively limited role in supporting the growth of the economy.317  How-
ever, the role of the financial markets in the economy will become increas-
ingly more significant.318
If we can show that the banking sector and financial markets have not
impeded the growth of the economy, our third conclusion is that alterna-
tive financing channels have had great success in supporting the growth of
the Hybrid Sector— the sector which contributes most of the economic
growth, compared to the State and Listed Sectors.  The shadow financial
sector relies on alternative financing channels, including internal finance,
311. Id. at 5.
312. Id. at 5– 6.
313. Id. at 6.
314. See id. at 6.
315. Id.
316. Allen et al., supra note 48, at 54.
317. Id. at 54– 55.
318. Id. at 55.
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and on alternative governance mechanisms, such as those based on trust,
reputation and relationships, and competition in output and input markets
to support the growth of the Hybrid Sector.319  It is possible that these
alternative institutions are superior to western-style legal institutions in
supporting a fast-growing economy such as China’s.320
We believe the formal financial sector of banks and financial markets
will continue to develop; an ever-improving legal structure is desirable to
facilitate this continued development.  However, the informal and shadow
banking sectors also have a great deal to contribute on an ongoing basis.
These sectors do not rely on conventional legal underpinnings. The lack of
conventional underpinning in the shadow banking sector should not be
discouraged, as this structure can be an advantage in the growth of China’s
economy.
319. Id. at 55.
320. Id.
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